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Introduction
On December 4, 2001, federal agents raided the offices of the Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development, arrested the organization's
officers, and froze $5 million worth of assets.' Ten days later on
December 14, 2001, the Global Relief Fund suffered the same fate when
its assets were seized, and its co-founder Rabih Haddad was arrested.2
That same day Benevolence International's assets were also frozen, and
its U.S. citizen president, Enaam Arnaout, was arrested and taken into
custody on charges of providing material support to terrorism. 3 Prior to
their effective closure, the three organizations were the largest Islamic
charities in the United States. Although each charitable organization
had been operating for more than a decade, 5 all three were systematically
raided and shut down soon after the federal government's post-9/11
official declaration of its war on terrorism-a war that includes
prosecuting anyone who provides material support to designated terrorist
organizations.6 By February 2003, the Department of Justice proudly
announced its completion of 70 similar investigations into terrorism
financing, designating 36 entities as terrorist organizations, and freezing
over $113 million in financial assets of 62 organizations allegedly
supporting terrorism. 7 The fact that almost every criminal terrorism case
filed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has included a charge
of providing material support to a terrorist organization reveals the
* The University of Texas School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2004. Associate Editor,
Texas Law Review. The University of Texas Center for Middle Eastern Studies, M.A. Candidate,
May 2004. 1 am especially grateful to Professor Sarah Cleveland and Professor Barbara Hines for
their valuable academic support.
1. Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcrofi, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2002);
John Mintz & Neely Tucker, Judge Backs US. on Assets Seizure, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2002, at
A12.
2. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784-85 (N.D. III. 2002); David
Shepardson, Ruling Cuts at Justice Dep't's New Authority, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 27, 2003, at Al.
3. Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935, 936-37 (N.D. II1. 2002).
4. Dan Eggen & John Mintz, Muslim Groups' IRS Files Sought: Hill Panel Probing
Alleged Terror Ties, WASH. POST., Jan. 14, 2004, at Al ("The United States has frozen more than
$136 million in assets allegedly linked to al Qaeda or other terrorist groups and has effectively shut
down the operations of the largest U.S.-based Islamic charities.").
5. Tanya Weinberg, Muslims Feel Burden of Area's Ties to Terror; Many Suspects Have
South Florida Link, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2003, at 1B (citing the establishment of
Benevolence International in 1993); see Shepardson, supra note 2 (citing the establishment of the
Global Relief Fund in 1992); Steve McGonigle, Ex-Agent Says Criminal Probe of Richardson,
Texas, Firm Based on Charity Data, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20, 2002, at 33A (citing the
establishment of the Holy Land Foundation in 1989).
6. Richard Willing, Trial For Muslim Terror Suspects is 'Test For Justice '; Prosecutors
Say Group Belonged to Sleeper Cell, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2003, at Al I (targeting suspects with
charges of providing material support is key to stopping terrorists before they can strike).
7. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Feb. 2003; William March, Al-Arian
Inquiry Took Turn After 9/11, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 23, 2003, at 1; Chaya Gil, The Links Between
Local Charities and Terrorist Groups: An Israeli Perspective, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 10, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 2842724 (citing the arrest of Jamil Sarsour in Milwaukee and the arrest of
four men in Texas for providing material support to terrorism).
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significance of material support laws as the linchpin of the ongoing war
on terrorism.
8
To many unsuspecting Americans, these events represent success
stories on the part of the United States government with respect to the
legitimate goal of terrorism prevention. To others, they raise red flags
concerning fundamental constitutional rights.9 Although critics of anti-
terrorism laws generally accept the objective of terrorism prevention, the
means currently utilized by the federal government in pursuing these
legitimate ends are highly questionable from a legal as well as a
normative perspective. For example, are these laws imposing guilt by
association on individuals that support legitimate humanitarian aid
projects? Do these laws provide adequate opportunity for defendants to
face their accusers, the United States government in this case, and
provide evidence in defense of their proclaimed innocence? Are these
laws being used as a smoke screen to persecute politically unpopular
individuals and groups affiliated with Islam and/or the Middle East rather
than to eliminate bona fide criminal activity?
This Article attempts to answer these questions by illustrating how
the current laws on designating foreign terrorist organizations and
providing material support to terrorist organizations may violate
organizations' and individuals' constitutional Due Process and First
Amendment rights. Two specific fact patterns are the focus of this
Article with respect to the constitutional analysis.
First, individuals in the United States who have knowingly donated
large sums of money to the three Islamic charities previously mentioned
are finding themselves under investigation for providing material support
to terrorist organization. These investigations are taking place despite
the individuals' original intent for their money to be spent on
humanitarian projects in the Middle East or Central Asia. These donors
not only lacked any specific intent to support terrorism, but they may
have considered their donations to be a form of political expression and
8. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History In The War On Terrorism, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2003); see also Council on American-Islamic Relations - New
York Chapter, Sheikh Ala A-Sadawi 's Sentencing Hearing: No Charges of Terrorism, But Allusions
Are Made, Nov. 12, 2003 (criticizing U.S. government officials for "insinuat[ing] terrorism related
activities to a case where the charges do not include those activities"); Rebecca Carr & Eunice
Moscoso, Virginia Group Finances Terror, US. Says, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 16,
2003, at Al (describing the government's targeting of a network of 100 Islamic charities,
educational organizations, and companies collectively called the Safa Group for conspiring to
support several Islamic terrorist groups, yet after 18 months of investigation there have yet to be
formal terrorism charges due to insufficient evidence of wrongdoing).
9. Of the 6,400 cases referred to federal prosecutors by investigators, only 2,001 cases had
filed charges and 879 of those cases resulted in conviction. Of the 879 convictions, five received
prison terms of 20 or more years, 23 received sentences between 5 and 20 years, 373 received
between I day and 5 years, and the remaining 478 received no prison time at all. Rebecca Carr,
Terrorism Arrests Yield Little Jail Time, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 8, 2003, at Al. This
low yield further discredits the federal government's anti-terrorism crusade as exaggerated and
misdirected.
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association. 10 The donations, for instance, may have represented their
belief in the rights of the children in war-torn areas, such as the West
Bank and Gaza, to have food, shelter, and clothing despite the prevalent
acts of violence committed against their communities as well as by
members of their communities." In the context of pre-war, Saddam-run
Iraq, U.S. donors may have given their money to Global Relief Fund to
sponsor an Iraqi orphan as a form of political protest against the United
States' sanctions on Iraq' 2 and against Saddam's starvation of his people
through the misallocation of state funds.'
3
The second fact pattern is similar to the first, but relates to the
charitable activities of U.S.-based philanthropic organizations. These
Islamic charities openly advertised their participation in humanitarian
projects in the Middle East and Central Asia through their monetary
donations to orphanages, medical clinics, hospitals and schools. Due to
the reality of the situation in these war-torn, impoverished areas, some of
the orphanages, clinics, and schools may receive money from a variety of
sources, including from multi-purpose organizations, 14 such as Hamas
(also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement), in order to stay
open. 15  Although these civil institutions are not affiliated with the
10. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Florida Arrest Renews Debate Over Muslim Charities, WASH.
POST, Jan. 4, 2003, at A4 (describing the U.S. government's prosecution of Jesse Maali because of
his large donations to Islamic charities during the 1990s and the government's inability to charge
him for providing material support due lack of evidence); Steve McGonigle, FBI Affidavit Says
Dallas-Area High-Tech Firm Made Payments to Hamas Leader, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS,
Feb. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 13607690 (describing the investigations of Mousa Abu
Marzook, Bayan Elashi, and four brothers for providing material support to terrorism); Jerry
Markon, Prosecution Challenged in Islamic Charity Case: Judge Questions Numerous Allegations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at A32 (describing the government's attempts to persuade a U.S.
district court in Alexandria to impose a ten year penalty on Soliman S. Biheiri for providing material
support to terrorism through his "social relationship" with Mousa Abu Marzook).
11. See, e.g., Maureen Haydeen, Ramadan's Tradition in Turmoil, COURIER & PRESS
NEWS, at http:/lwww.myinky.com/ecplnews/article/0,1626,ECP 734_2379259,00.html. "I think it's
in our interest as Americans to make sure that money is getting in to the hands of the neediest
people," stated the head of the Islamic Society of North America. Id. Yassar el-Banna, Palestinian
Orphans Left out in Ramadan, at http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2003-
11/05/article03.shtml (Nov. 5, 2003) (documenting the deprivation of 15,000 Palestinian orphans of
much needed aid after U.S. President George Bush froze the assets of five pro-Palestinians charities
abroad).
12. George Bisharat, Sanctions as Genocide, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379,
381 (2001) (stating that "[i]n the twelve years that have followed [the imposition of sanctions], as
many as one to two million Iraqis may have died as a result of sanctions, many of them children
under the age of five").
13. U.S. Government Information and Resources, Saddam Hussein 10 Years Later: No
Regard for Humanitarian Needs of Iraqi People, Says UN, at
http://usgovinfo.about.com1ibrarylweeklylaa0216Olc.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
14. Multi-purpose organizations are those that have both military and non-military,
humanitarian branches of their organizations. The Irish Republican Army is another example. See
Evelyn Brody, The Twilight of Organizations Form of Charity: Musings on Normal Silber, A
Corporate Form of Freedom: The Emergency of the Modem Non-Profit Sector, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1261, 1262-63 (2002) (describing the problems of dealing with multi-purpose bona fide
charities that incidentally engage in illegal activities).
15. Hamas has been officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization since October 8,
1997. 62 Fed. Reg. 52650 (Oct. 8, 1997).
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military branches of the local multi-purpose organizations, the U.S.
government is treating them as linked with terrorism for purposes of laws
on providing material support to terrorism. Therefore, if an orphanage,
school, hospital, or medical clinic receives even $1 from the non-
militant, social welfare branch of a local multi-purpose organization,
then no U.S. organization or donor may knowingly contribute any funds
to these local institutions directly or via a U.S.-based charitable
organization.16 Ultimately, innocent, impoverished individuals such as
children, pregnant women, the sick, the elderly, and orphans that have
nothing to do with terrorism (and in fact bear the brunt of the ongoing
violent conflict) are collectively being punished for their condition.' 7
The U.S.-based charities as well as U.S. donors, including those who
support the war on terrorism, may reasonably disagree on political
grounds with the U.S. government's reasoning. Moreover, donors may
believe that at the very least they should retain their due process rights
with respect to having their First Amendment rights constrained.
Accordingly, this Article begins by describing the legal framework
in which such designations occur, the various ways in which an
organization can be designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO),
the limits of judicial review, and the relationship between the designation
process and the criminal provisions and criminal prosecutions on
providing material support to designated organizations. Part II explains
the comprehensive implications, for individuals and organizations, of
designating an organization as an FTO, paying particular attention to
criminal sanctions. Part III challenges the reasoning applied in existing
case law in regard to procedural and substantive Due Process
implications of FTO designation and providing material support to FTOs.
Part IV challenges the courts' reasoning in providing material support
cases with respect to First Amendment freedom of expression and
association rights. Part IV emphasizes the past and ongoing targeting of
Arab and Muslim individuals and organizations with respect to the
enforcement of laws related to terrorism. Finally, Part V concludes with
some recommendations on how to improve the existing FTO designation
process and the criminal provisions for providing material support to
FTOs or terrorist activities to minimize the risk of violating the Due
Process Clause and First Amendment and avoid erroneous results.
16. Benjamin Duncan, US Islamic Charities In Trouble, ALJAZEERA.NET, at
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F447DB5C-38CB-472C-AD-C22B75D17E56.htm (Dec. 7,
2003) (describing the stringent and burdensome guidelines issued by the Treasury Department
advising Islamic charities to "ensure that no individual employees of any foreign recipient
organizations or subcontractors of those organizations support terrorism in any way").
17. See, e.g., id. (stating that the post-9/11 drop-off in funding is only hurting the people
who need it the most, those that are primarily worried about where their next meal is coming from);
el-Banna, supra note 11 (documenting the deprivation of 15,000 Palestinian orphans of much-
needed aid after U.S. President George Bush froze the assets of five pro-Palestinians charities
abroad).
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The argument proceeds as follows: (1) the FTO designation
process is inadequately transparent, creating a high risk of incorrect
designations and erroneous deprivations of fundamental interests of
liberty and property; (2) judicial review of the designation process should
include a defendant's counter-evidence rather than be limited to an
administrative record completely controlled by a federal official;' 8 (3) the
mens rea element for providing material support to terrorist
organizations or terrorist activities should be changed from 'knowingly'
to 'intentionally'; and (4) courts should protect individuals' and
organizations' First Amendment freedom of expression and association
rights by applying strict scrutiny with respect to accusations that a
defendant aided terrorist organizations or activities. In the alternative, if
intermediate scrutiny is the proper judicial test, then the existing criminal
provision is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect First
Amendment rights. Such a shortcoming can be overcome by applying
the third recommendation above of changing the mens rea to
"intentionally."
This Article's analysis is deliberately limited to the provision of
material support in the form of money and physical assets rather than
military training. Cases addressing visits to an Afghanistanian training
camp are assumed to be of a different nature than attempts to provide
humanitarian aid to impoverished individuals abroad, and therefore are
beyond the scope of this analysis.' 9 The Article focuses more on the
implications of the laws for individuals who seek to donate money to
purely humanitarian causes abroad rather than those contesting whether
or not conduct is terrorism such that its assistance warrants criminal
sanctions. For example, many individuals who merely intended to
donate money to humanitarian projects in the Middle East find
themselves subject to aggressive federal scrutiny and investigation.
Numerous individuals who donated large sums of money to the above
mentioned Islamic charities, prior to their FTO designations, are finding
themselves targets of federal investigations for providing material
support to terrorist organizations.2 °  Observers of these individuals'
ordeals are subsequently deterred from donating money or property to
any humanitarian projects affiliated with the Middle East or Islam,
18. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir.
1999) ("The information recited is certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be received
in court. It is instead material the Secretary of State compiled as a record, from sources named and
unnamed, the accuracy of which we have no way of evaluating.").
19. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Goba,
220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
20. See Roig-Franzia, supra note 10, at A4 (describing the investigation of Jesse Maali);
see also March, supra note 7 (describing the investigation of AI-Arian); Gil, supra note 7 (citing the
arrest of Jamil Sarsour in Milwaukee and the arrest of four men in Texas for providing material
support to terrorism).
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resulting in a chilling effect and suppression of their freedom of
expression and association.
21
I. DESIGNATING A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
This Section explains the two most common methods by which
organizations have been designated as a "foreign terrorist organization."
The first is under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
199622 (AEDPA), and the second is under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act23 (IEEPA). The AEDPA imposes some, albeit
insufficient, limitations on the Executive's power to designate an FTO.
Meanwhile, the IEEPA only requires a declaration of an emergency in
order to unleash the President's plenary powers.24  The latter has
undoubtedly been deliberately used more frequently against the Islamic
charities to offset the burden of gathering the dearth of evidence
otherwise necessary to freeze their assets.
In order for an organization to qualify for designation as an FTO
under the AEDPA, it must meet three qualifications. 25  First, the
organization must be "foreign. 26  Second, the organization must engage
in terrorism.27 The statute includes in the definition of terrorism the
solicitation of funds or other things of value for a terrorist activity or a
designated terrorist organization, and committing an act that the actor
knows or should know affords material support to a terrorist activity or
organization.28 Third, the organization's terrorist activities must impact
21. See Haydeen, supra note 11 (discussing hesitancy of Muslims in America to donate to
Islamic charities and humanitarian aid in the Middle East out of fear of criminal prosecution for
providing material support to terrorism); Laura Goldstein, Muslims Hesitating on Gifts As U.S.
Scrutinizes Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at B I (noting American Muslim's fear of donating
to Islamic charities due to federal government's aggressive campaign against Islamic charities and
donors in the United States); Madhu Krishnamurthy, Fears About Charities Force Muslims to
Change How They Give, DAILY HERALD, Nov. i1, 2003, at
www.dailyherald.com/mchenry/main-story.asp?intlD=3793610; Duncan, supra note 16 (stating that
the biggest reason for the 40% reduction in financial donations to Islamic charities since Sept. 11,
2001 is "a fear that the unproven allegations made against the [Muslim] charities will be leveled
against the donors").
22. Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (effective April 24, 1996) [hereinafter AEDPA].
23. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1707 (West 2003) [hereinafter IEEPA].
24. Id. at § 1701(a) (2003).
25. 8 U.S.C.A. § I I82(a)(3)(B)(vi) (West 2003).
26. Id. at § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I).
27. Id. at § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining terrorist activities as "any activity which is unlawful
under the laws of the place where it is committed (of which, if it had been committed in the United
States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State)" and involves hijacking a
vessel, seizing or detaining and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain another individual in
order to compel a third person to do or abstain from doing any act, an assassination, the use of any
biological weapons, explosive, or firearms with the intent to endanger the safety of individuals or
cause substantial damage to property). A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do the foregoing is also a
terrorist activity. Id.
28. Id. at § 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV).
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U.S. national security.29 Although an entire Article could be devoted to
the definition of terrorism and whether or not certain activities impact
U.S. national security, this Article will focus more on the designation
process itself and the legal ramifications of the designation.
Of the four methods available for FTO designations, two are most
commonly applied.30  The first method is set forth in the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provisions that modified the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1996. 3' These provisions give
the Secretary of State the authority to designate an organization based on
the three conditions stated above.32 Seven days prior to making a formal
designation, the Secretary must state her intent to designate in writing
and communicate it to the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives, the President pro tempore, the Majority Leader, the
Minority Leader of the Senate, and any members of relevant committees
in Congress.33 Upon the expiration of seven days, the Secretary
publishes the designation in the Federal Register. At no time during the
designation process is the Secretary required to notify the organization
that it is being considered for designation as an FTO.34  The publication
serves as formal notice to an organization regarding its designation.35
The designation constitutes a requirement for U.S. financial institutions
to immediately block all financial transactions involving the
organization's assets until further instruction from the Secretary.3 6 The
deprivation of assets occurs on the same day notice is provided to the
respective organization via publication in the Federal Register.37
Generally, the designation is valid for two years, after which it can be
renewed .38
29. Id. at § 1 189(a)(I)(C). National security is defined as "the national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United States." Id. at § 1182(c)(2).
30. Id. at § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi); IEEPA §§ 1701-1706 (West 2003). There are two other
designation methods that are the least often utilized. The first is a designation by the Secretary in
consultation with the Attorney General (AG) or upon the request of the AG after finding that an
organization engages in terrorist activities or provides material support to further terrorist activities.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I1) (West 2003) (emphasis added). This method appears to be very
similar to the first method cited in the text except for the direct involvement of the AG and the
specific reference to providing material support to further terrorist activities as a basis for being
designated as an FTO. The second least utilized method is designation based on an organization's
composition of two or more individuals, organized or not, that engage in specific terrorist activities.
Id. at § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(l1l). The specified activities include committing or inciting to commit,
under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist
activity; preparing or planning a terrorist activity; and gathering information on potential targets for
terrorist activity. Id. at § 1I82(a)(3)(B)(vi)(l)-(1I).
31. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 2003); Id. at § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
32. Jd. at§ 1189.
33. Id. at § 1 189(a)(2)(A)(i).
34. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, D.C. No. CV-98-
01971-ABC, *6 (9th Cir. Dec. 3,2003).
35. 8 U.S.C.A. § I 189(a)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2003).
36. Id. at § 1189(a)(2)(B).
37. Id. at § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
38. Id. at § 1 189(a)(4)(B).
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The Secretary bases her decision on an administrative record,
which may include classified information, that she creates and controls.39
An organization has thirty days from the date of publication to challenge
the designation only in the D.C. Circuit, but the review is based solely on
the administrative record.40 Therefore, when the limited judicial review
that is permitted is invoked, much of the record is disclosed ex parte and
in camera.4' Moreover, courts have interpreted the statute as limiting
judicial review to whether an organization is foreign and whether the
organization has engaged in terrorist activities, but not whether U.S.
national security is affected. The courts deem the final requirement as
within the full discretion of the executive branch's plenary foreign affairs
power. 42 Meanwhile, the court will invalidate a designation if it finds it
to be (1) "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion; '" 3 (2) "contrary to
constitutional power, right, privilege, or immunity;" 44 (3) "in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory
right;' 5 or (4) "lacking substantial support in the administrative records
taken as a whole or in classified information submitted .... When
checking for such violations, the court reviews whether the Secretary has
followed statutory procedures, made the requisite findings, and whether
the record she assembled substantially supports her findings.47 Due to
the courts' application of a highly deferential standard of review towards
administrative agency action, there are very few cases where a court has
actually set aside a designation as unlawful.
48
39. Id. at § 1189(a)(3); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082,
D.C. No. CV-98-0197 1-ABC, *6 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) ("Nor does the statute require the Secretary
to afford an organization the opportunity to submit or review evidence on its behalf during the
designation process.").
40. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1)-(2) (West 2003). The court in United States v. Rahmani
rejected the limitation of challenging the designation to the D.C. Circuit by interpreting the language
"may seek judicial review ... in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit" in 8 U.S.C.A. §1 189(b)(1) to be a recommendation rather than a requirement. 209 F. Supp.
2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Moreover, the court could not find any clear and convincing evidence of
Congressional intent to foreclose judicial review of a designation by other federal courts. Id.
41. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, n.4 (D.D.C.
2002) (noting the government's filing of a motion to submit classified information in camera and ex
parte); see also Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 808 (N.D. III. 2002) (noting
the defendant's submission ofexparte, in camera documents as legal and appropriate).
42. People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir.
1999); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(b)(3)(A) (West 2003) limits the scope ofjudicial review to the five
factors listed in the text.
44. Id. at § 1 182(b)(3)(B).
45. Id. at § 1182(b)(3)(C).
46. Id. at § 1182(b)(3)(D) (emphasis added).
47. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22.
48. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (discussing what has come to be known as Chevron deference to administrative agency
action). See also United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding
AEDPA § 1189 as unconstitutional on its face rather than merely rejecting the designation in point);
Nat'l Council of Resistance oflran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding
the case back to the Secretary of State for further proceedings consistent with the opinion rather than
deeming the designation itself unlawful with no remand).
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The second designation method, and the one most commonly used
with respect to U.S.-based Islamic charities, is found in the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).49 The IEEPA authorizes the
President to regulate international economic transactions during wars or
national emergencies.50 The statute's asset freezing provision applies to
"any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that [the
President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such
hostilities or attacks against the United States . . . " as well as to suspect
domestic organizations, regardless of their affiliation with a specific
attack.5 1 The IEEPA authority was used for the first time with respect to
terrorist organizations in 1995 when President Clinton declared the
Middle East peace process as posing a national emergency.5 2 Clinton
issued Executive Order 12,947 on January 23, 1995, which designated
ten Palestinian organizations and two Jewish extremist groups opposed
to the peace process as "specially designated terrorists" (SDT). 3
Clinton's declaration authorized the Secretary of State to name additional
SDTs based on their being owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf
of, an entity designated by the President.
5 4
President George W. Bush's Executive Order 13,224 of September
23, 2001 declared a national emergency to deal with the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks 5  Consequently, the President authorized the
freezing of all assets of "specially designated global terrorists" (SDGT),
who are defined as "foreign persons determined by the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney
General, to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing,
acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, ' 5 6 as well as
persons who assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for acts of terrorism or persons subject to the
49. 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1707 (West 2003); See Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp.
2d 779, 785 (N.D. III. 2002) (noting that the designation was made under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act); see also Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcrofl, 219
F. Supp. 2d 57, 62 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that the designation was made under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act); Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935,
936-37 (N.D. I11. 2002) (noting that the designation was made under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act).
50. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Validity, Construction, and Operation of International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1707, 183 A.L.R. FED. 57, § 1701(a)(b)
(2003).
51. IEEPA § 170 1(a)(l)(C) (West 2003).
52. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. § 319 (1995). See also Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Inst., 291 F.2d 1000, 1002 n.I (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing Clinton's use of the IEEPA); Holy Land
Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (describing Clinton's use of the IEEPA against Middle Eastern
organizations).
53. Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8, at 26.
54. Id.
55. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 785 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (West
Supp. 2002).
56. Id. at § 1(b).
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order.57  The IEEPA includes a humanitarian aid exception to asset
blocking, pertaining to donations of articles intended to relieve human
suffering such as food, clothing, and medicine. 8  However, an
organization that donates both humanitarian goods and money cannot
benefit from the exception due to its inability to access the blocked funds
needed to purchase the humanitarian goods.5 9
Therefore, an organization can be designated by the Department of
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as either an SDT
under Clinton's 1995 Executive Order or as an SDGT under Bush's 2001
Executive Order. Either way, the organization's assets are immediately
frozen. Moreover, the USA PATRIOT ACT strengthened the IEEPA by
making an investigation into whether or not an organization provides
material support to terrorists (i.e. an SDT or an SDGT) sufficient
grounds for freezing its assets.60 Pursuant to these new provisions and
executive orders, the assets of the Holy Land Foundation, the Global
Relief Fund, and Benevolence International were frozen despite the fact
that none of these organizations has been formally charged or convicted
in a court of law for providing material support to terrorist
organizations.
61
II. IMPLICATIONS OF BEING A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
The FTO designation process alone holds no intrinsic value.
Rather, the designations trigger an array of other punitive laws that can
be applied once an individual is found to have affiliated himself with an
FTO. As discussed below, immigration laws involving inadmissibility,
removal, mandatory detention, naturalization, asylum, and discretionary
relief are affected by an individual's relationship with an FTO. Any
individuals associated with an FTO may be criminally prosecuted for
providing material support to a terrorist organization. Civil suits for
wrongful death or injury from terrorist attacks can be brought against
57. Id. at § l(d)(i).
58. IEEPA § 1702(b)(2) (West 2003).
59. Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 n.14 (D.D.C.
2002) (noting that the humanitarian aid exception permitting donations of articles is meaningless to
HLF since it cannot access its bank accounts and cannot purchase food, clothing, or medicine to send
as statutorily permissible humanitarian aid).
60. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 106, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001)
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT ACT](adding § 1702(a)(l)(B) to the IEEPA).
61. Note that the designation of a foreign terrorist organization is a separate process from
the criminal prosecution for providing material support to terrorism or terrorist organizations. Those
designated under the IEEPA are under investigation for providing material support to terrorist
organizations, the results of which can be used to criminally prosecute them for providing material
support to other terrorist organizations. Hence you must first be designated as an FTO based on
allegations by the Executive branch of providing material support in order to be criminally
prosecuted for providing material support.
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organizations or individuals accused of aiding terrorist organizations.62
As a result, the stakes are high and the consequences can be severe for
any individual or entity accused of associating with a designated FTO.
A. IMMIGRATION
A non-citizen's entire life in the United States can be devastated
upon any allegations of affiliation with an organization designated as an
FTO.63 It goes without saying that any American consulate abroad will
refuse to admit, or re-admit, the non-citizen seeking entry into the United
States.64 More importantly, an accused alien terrorist 65 physically in the
United States becomes ineligible for numerous forms of immigration
relief including withholding of removal,66 cancellation of removal,67
voluntary departure,68 adjustment of status,
69 registry,70 and asylum. 71
The accused non-citizen, which includes permanent residents that have
resided in the U.S. for many years, is also subject to mandatory detention
for a potentially lengthy period due to the Attorney General's power to
certify individuals as terrorist threats.72 The mandatory detention process
allows the government to detain the non-citizen without charge for seven
days.73 At the expiration of the seven days, the AG must charge the
person with a criminal offense 74 (typically it is a minor immigration
62. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev., 291 F.3d 1000
(7th Cir. 2002).
63. See Associated Press, Lebanese Man Appeals Deportation Order, WASH. POST, Dec.
28, 2002, at A (noting that Rabih Haddad, the co-founder of the Global Relief Foundation, was
detained for over a year with no charges filed against him).
64. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 182(a)(3)((A)-(B)) (West 2003).
65. Although "alien terrorist" is not explicitly defined in the INA code, it may be inferred
as an alien who engages in terrorist activities, intends to cause death or serious bodily harm, incite
terrorist activity, is a representative of a foreign terrorist organization, or is a member of a designated
foreign terrorist organization which the alien knows or should have known is a terrorist organization.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(l)-(V) (West 2003). It is worth noting that any officer, official,
representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is explicitly mentioned. Id. at
§ 1182(a)(3)(B).
66. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (West 2003) (denying withholding of deportation from
aliens described in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)(B)).
67. Id. at § 1229b(c)(4) (denying cancellation of removal for aliens inadmissible under 8
U.S.C.A. § 182(a)(3) or deportable under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)).
68. Id. at § 1229c(b)(1)(C) (denying voluntary departure to aliens deportable under 8
U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)).
69. Id. at § 1229b(c)(4) (denying adjustment for aliens inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3) or deportable under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)).
70. Id. at § 1259(d) (denying registry for aliens deportable under 8 U.S.C.A. §
1227(a)(4)(B)).
71. 8 U.S.C.S. § 11 58(b)(2)(v) (West 2003) (denying asylum for aliens inadmissible under
8 U.S.C.A. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(i) or deportable under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)(B)).
72. Id. at § 1226a(a)(3) ("The Attorney General may certify an alien ... if he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the alien [lists the various terrorism related statutes] ... or is
engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States.").
73. Id. at §1226a(a)(5).
74. Id.
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charge rather than a terrorism offense). 75 The charges trigger prolonged
detention with no release on bond and allow for re-certification every six
months. 76 For all practical purposes, the AG can extend the mandatory
detention provision into indefinite detention up to the point of physical
removal." Moreover, a person physically in the U.S. who is deemed
inadmissible for security, terrorism, or foreign relations grounds is
subject to expedited deportation with no right to administrative or
judicial review and forfeits discretionary waiver provisions.78 As long as
the Secretary of State makes a facially reasonable determination that the
person's presence or activity would have potentially adverse foreign
policy consequences, then the government has met its burden of proof,
and the immigration judge will issue the removal order. 7
The USA PATRIOT ACT expanded the grounds of inadmissibility
from members of an FTO to anyone associated with an FTO.
Additionally, the definition of a terrorist organization was expanded to
include "any group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not,
that commit or incite to commit terrorist activity, plans a terrorist
activity, or gathers information for potential targets of terrorist
activity.' ' 8° The USA PATRIOT ACT utilizes these expanded definitions
to impose an ideological test for entry into the U.S. by prohibiting entry
of any representative of a political or social group "whose public
endorsement of acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State has
determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or eliminate
terrorist activities. '81
These new immigration laws do not require an individual to have
actually known that the organization is a terrorist one, but simply that he
should have known it is a terrorist organization.8 2  According to INS
Commissioner Ziglar, any act that the non-citizen knows, or should
reasonably know, will provide material support to a terrorist organization
makes him inadmissible and subject to removal, even if the non-citizen
did not specifically intend to support the terrorist activity and did not
know that the organization was a terrorist organization.83 The only
75. Susan Sachs, Court Asked to OK Secret Deportations, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 2002, at 9
(noting that most of the 1200 Arabs and Muslims detained in the aftermath of September 11, 2001
were charged with immigration violations and not terrorism related charges).
76. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a)(7) (West 2003).
77. Sachs, supra note 75 (noting that the Attorney General planned to secretly deport all
post-9/i I detainees).
78. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(c) (West 2003).
79. Id. at § 1182(a)(3)(C)(i) ("An alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United
States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences for the United States is inadmissible.").
80. USA PATRIOT ACT § 411(a)(l)(F)(iv)(l-IlI) (2001) (creating 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)).
81. Id. at § 411 (a) (amending 8 U.S.C § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb)).
82. Daniel Levy, US. Citizenship and Naturalization Handbook, 2002 NAT'L IMMIGR.
PROJECT OF THE NAT'L LAW. GUILD ch. 8 app.8-1 (INS Commissioner Ziglar's Memorandum on the
New Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oct. 31, 2002) (USCITNAT APP 8-1 on Westlaw)).
83. Id.
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exceptions include (1) if the organization was not designated as an FTO
at the time of the individual's activity or (2) if the individual can prove
that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
activity would further the organization's terrorist activity. 4  The
individual bears the burden of proof.
B. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Citizens and non-citizens alike are subject to criminal sanctions
under the AEDPA if found to have "knowingly provide[d] material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[ed] or
conspire[d] to do so,"' s5 or knowingly provided material support to
further terrorist activities.86 Accused individuals face up to fifteen years
of prison or life imprisonment if the death of any person results.87
Material support is defined as the provision of "currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious material. 88  The current limited
exception for medicine and religious material replaced the broader pre-
AEDPA exception for "humanitarian assistance to persons not directly
involved in such violations." 89 The rationale for the change was that
"foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization
facilitates that conduct." 90 Consequently, numerous organizations that
donate humanitarian aid to hospitals, orphanages, and schools of
impoverished, nonviolent refugees in the Middle East are legally exposed
and vulnerable to this significant change in the statutory language.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that an individual accused of
providing material support cannot "raise any question concerning the
validity of the issuance of such designation or redesignation as a defense
or an objection at any trial or hearing." 9' It is probable that an individual
will miss the limited opportunity to challenge a designation since she
may not appreciate how the designation will personally impact her in the
84. Id.; 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(IV)(cc), (V)(cc), (Vl)(dd) (West 2003).
85. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2003).
86. Id.
87. Id. at § 2339A(a), § 2339B(a)(l).
88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (West 2003).
89. Jacqueline Benson, Send Me Your Money: Controlling International Terrorism By
Restricting Fundraising in the United States, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 321, 327, 331 (1999).
90. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting
legislative history explaining the reasoning for limiting the exception)
91. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(8) (West 2003). See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003
WL 21698266, *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003) (denying defendants' challenge to the Islamic
Group's FTO designation due to a lack of standing and statutory limitations).
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future. Therefore, any due process shortcomings imposed on the
organization through the FTO designation process will inevitably affect
the individual's subsequent criminal (or civil) prosecution.92
C. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
The terrorist designation and the relevant criminal charges also
trigger newly expanded powers under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). As soon as the Secretary of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designates the FTO, the government can
go to a FISA Court, instead of an Article III court, for a search warrant
"approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence
information.393 As long as the investigation's "significant" purpose is to
gather intelligence, the secretive FISA warrant can be obtained.94 This
condition is often easily met by a government showing that the accused
is an agent of a foreign power.95 If the accused is a "United States
person ''  there must be probable cause to believe she is aligned with a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.97 The information gathered
can be used against the individual or entity in subsequent criminal
prosecutions. Therefore, terrorism-related charges serve as powerful
tools to avoid an individual's First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights,
otherwise applicable in criminal prosecutions.98
92. See generally Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.2d 1000, 1002 n.I (7th Cir. 2002).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2003). Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT, a FISA
warrant required that the primary purpose of the investigation was to obtain foreign intelligence
information. USA PATRIOT ACT § 218 (2001).
94. USA PATRIOT ACT § 218 (2001).
95. An agent of a foreign power is defined as any person other than a United States person
(citizen or legal permanent resident) who acts in the United States as a member of a foreign power
OR any person who knowingly engages in international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation
therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b) (West 2003). Someone
accused of providing material support to an FTO will likely fall under one of these definitions.
96. A "United States person means a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence . . . an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of
which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a
corporation which is incorporated in the United States." 50 U.S.C.A. § 180 1(h)(4)(i) (West 2003).
97. Id. at § 1824(a)(3); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 789 (N.D. 111.
2002).
98. See generally David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality
of the U.S.A PATRlOT Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
291 (2003) (describing the negative impact of the new FISA laws on an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights); Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The U.S.A PATRIOTACTof2001,
33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002) (highlighting the abuse of the USA PATRIOT ACT's amendments
lowering the probable cause requirement for warrants regarding criminal investigations); Dan Eggen,
FBI Applies New Rules To Surveillance, WashingtonPost.com, Dec. 13, 2003, at
http://msnbc.msn.com/Default.aspx?id=3700237&amp;pl=0&pl=0 (noting how the FBI's increased
use of FISA search warrants for terrorism-related investigations has led to many more searches and
seizures in secret).
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These far-reaching implications, for citizens and non-citizens alike,
of designating an organization as terrorist, are sufficient cause for inquiry
into the constitutional ramifications. The bona fide risk of deprivation of
liberty, in the form of physical liberty, free speech, and the right to
property, mandates adherence to the Constitution. Therefore, all
residents of the United States, regardless of visa status, have a significant
interest in assuring the FTO designation process is not only accurate, but
also constitutional.
III. DUE PROCESS CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE
DESIGNATION PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits the
government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.99 Liberty includes a person's physical
liberty, as well as freedom of speech, expression, and association. 00
Property includes financial, as well as physical, assets. Due process is
guided by the principle that a hearing occur "at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner."'' "The pre-termination hearing need not
definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge, but should be an initial
check against mistaken decisions--essentially a determination of
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against
the defendant are true and support the proposed action'' 0 2 Therefore,
the essential requirements of due process are that meaningful notice and
an opportunity to respond be granted by the State to the defendant.
10 3
Upon a finding that certain substantive rights of life, liberty, and
property are implicated by government action, the question remains
regarding what process is due. Mathews v. Eldridge provides a
balancing test for the competing interests at stake as a means of deciding
whether or not a pre-deprivation hearing is due. °4 In this case, the
organization's interests in avoiding closure and erroneous seizure of their
assets is balanced against the government's immediate interest in
preventing the transfer of funds outside the country prior to a hearing or
trial, as well as against the broader interest in preventing the funding of
terrorist activities. In order to balance these competing interests, a court
applies a three-pronged test.'05  First, the court must assess the
importance of the private interest affected by the official action. 10 6 Then,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests is determined along
99. U.S. CONST. amend V.
100. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
101. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
102. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 533 (1985).
103. Id.
104. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
105. Id. at 335.
106. Id
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with the probable value of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.'0 7 Finally, the courts consider the government's interest in
preserving the existing procedures as well as the potential fiscal or
administrative burdens imposed through additional or substitute
procedural requirements. 08 Based on the results of these three prongs, a
court decides whether or not to provide a pre-deprivation hearing to the
organization or individual.
The FTO designation process undoubtedly implicates due process
rights because of the ensuing government seizure of an organization's
assets without a pre-deprivation hearing. Moreover, any person
associated with the organization faces potential criminal liability that
may result in up to fifteen years of imprisonment.' 9 Hence, the FTO
designation process must adhere to the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. However, existing case law, as well as ongoing federal
investigations, reveal the likelihood that due process may be being
violated. The following are problematic procedural and substantive due
process issues to be considered in the next sections: (1) pre-deprivation
hearings are denied to organizations; (2) organizations are not permitted
to present counter-evidence during the procedures, (3) the administrative
record is composed of classified evidence that is inaccessible to the
defendants, and (4) the investigations after September 11, 2001 have
focused almost entirely on Islamic and/or Arab defendants. This section
begins by summarizing the reasoning applied by courts to justify the
aforementioned issues in response to specific challenges of the FTO
designation process on due process grounds. This Article will then
challenge the courts' reasoning on procedural and substantive due
process grounds.
A. DUE PROCESS AFFORDED IN THE TERRORIST DESIGNATION
PROCESS
An organization designated as an FTO under the AEDPA receives
notice of its designation on the day the designation is published in the
Federal Register. 11  An organization designated under the IEEPA
remains ignorant of the designation until the moment its assets are
frozen, which is usually triggered by a mere investigation into its
activities.' In all cases, the organization receives no prior notice or
opportunity, in the form of a pre-deprivation hearing, to challenge the
decision.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 335.
109. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(a), § 2339B(a)(l) (West 2003).
110. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A) (West 2003).
111. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 779 (N.D. III. 2002).
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Before engaging in a due process analysis, a court must first
determine whether the due process clause applies to the foreign person or
entity. The test evaluates the following questions in creating a
constitutional claim: 1) "whether the person or entity has a constitutional
presence in the United States"; 2) "whether government action deprived
the person or entity of a constitutionally protected interest"; and 3)
"whether the procedural protections provided by the government, if any,
were constitutionally sufficient."
'" 12
The Supreme Court has found the "constitutional presence" test
satisfied based on whether or not a person or entity had "substantial
connections" in the U.S."I3  Although the test for finding "substantial
connections" is vague at best,"4 cases relevant to this Article topic have
based their decisions on an organization's physical presence in the
United States and its bank holdings within the United States." 5  The
second question always applies in FTO cases because the U.S.
government deprives a private party or entity of its assets. The third
question regarding constitutionally sufficient procedural protections
refers to the Mathews test for deciding what process is due." 6 Because
the issue of whether sufficient procedural protections exist is the most
complex and least straight forward,' t 7 the following section describes
how the courts have applied the Mathews test with respect to specific
organizations' challenges to their designation as FTOs.
1. DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT (AEDPA)
In 1999, People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States
became the first civil case involving an organization's due process
challenge to the FTO designation process."18 The organization claimed
that the AEDPA deprived it of due process because the AEDPA allowed
the government to condemn the organization and criminalize any
donations given to it without providing the organization notice and an
112. Joshua A. Ellis, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the AEDPA:
The National Council Court Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process, 2002 BYU L. REv. 675,
684 (2002).
113. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
114. HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION, Extraterritorial Applications of the Fourth
Amendment, 104 1ARV. L. REV. 276, 281-82 (1990).
115. Compare People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that "a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no
constitutional rights, under the due process clause, or otherwise") with Nat'l Council of Resistance
of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201-02 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (asserting that plaintiffs' overt
presence in the National Press Building in Washington, D.C. and bank account in a U.S. bank is
sufficient grounds for finding constitutional presence).
116. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976).
117. The other two issues relating to constitutional presence a constitutionally protected
interest are often easily resolved based on the facts of the case.
118. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 17.
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opportunity to be heard. 19  The court, however, avoided the
constitutional question by finding that the foreign entity lacked a
constitutional presence in the United States.'
20
Two years later, the National Council of Resistance of Iran also
challenged its designation as an FTO.121  The D.C. Circuit found the
organization was constitutionally present and that due process had been
violated. 22 The dearth of procedural participation by the designated
entity,123 the lack of notice of the evidence used against it, and the
unchecked possibility of third-hand accounts, press stories, and other
hearsay evidence dominating the record created a very high risk of
erroneous deprivation. 24 The court, however, did not declare the
AEDPA designation process unconstitutional, but rather remanded the
case back to the Secretary of State with instructions to afford the Plaintiff
entity an opportunity to file responses to non-classified evidence against
it, an opportunity to file evidence in support of its claims, and an
opportunity to have a meaningful hearing with the Secretary upon the
relevant findings.' 25 The court also instructed the Secretary of State to
provide notice to an FTO that a designation is impending and to afford
the organization an opportunity to present evidence. 126 The Court,
however, noted that the ruling did "not foreclose the possibility of the
Secretary, in an appropriate case, demonstrating the necessity of
withholding all notice and all opportunity to present evidence until the
designation is already made."' 27 Consequently, the Secretary came to the
same conclusion after giving the entity its court ordered due process
rights. 28  In post-9/11 cases, the Secretary will likely invoke the
exception to justify the withholding of notice and the use of secret
evidence in terrorist-related cases.
119. Id. at 22.
120. Id. (concluding that the organization had no bank deposits seized as a result of the
designation, thus had no substantial connections in the United States and no constitutional rights).
121. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 197-98 (D.C. Cit.
2001) (challenging the Secretary of State's 1999 designation of the National Council of Resistance
of Iran as an alias or alter ego of the designated Mojahedin e-Khalq).
122. Id. at209.
123. See supra Part I for a detailed discussion of the limits of an FTO's participation in the
designation process.
124. Nat ' Council, 251 F.3d at 196-97; See Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 19 ("Because nothing
in the legislation restricts the Secretary from acting on the basis of third hand accounts, press stories,
material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization's activities, the "administrative
record" may consist of little else."); see also Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 71 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[A]gency designations can be based on a broad range of evidence
including news reports, intelligence data, and hearsay declarations.").
125. Nat'l Council, 251 F.3d at 209. Incidentally, the Secretary came to the same
conclusion after giving the entity its court ordered due process rights.
126. Id. at 208-09.
127. Id. at 208.
128. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088 (Oct. 5,
2001) (citing the National Council of Resistance of Iran as an alias for the designation the
Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization).
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In 2002, a California federal district court in United States v.
Rahmani129 unconventionally rejected the government's claim that only
the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction over AEDPA FTO designation cases
and declared jurisdiction.1 30  Rahmani involved fifty-eight substantive
counts of providing material support to an FTO against seven defendants
of Middle Eastern heritage. 3' The defendants had contributed monetary
support between October 8, 1997 and February 27, 2001 to Mujaheddin-
e Khalq (MEK), a designated foreign terrorist organization. 3 2  The
defendants moved to dismiss the indictment by contending that the FTO
designation statute, both facially and under US. v. Mendoza-Lopez,
33
violated due process. 34 Although the court rejected the Mendoza-Lopez
due process violation claim, 135 the court did strike down the AEDPA
provisions as facially unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment Due Process
grounds. 136 The relevant AEDPA provisions denied an organization the
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner due to the organization's
inability to object to the administrative record or supplement it with
information to contradict the designation. 137  The judge criticized the
D.C. Circuit's reasoning in National Council of Resistance of Iran138 for
engaging in judicial legislation, claiming the D.C. Circuit should have
declared the designation process unconstitutional rather than upholding
the statute after finding a due process violation.' 39 Moreover, the judge
refused to enforce the provisions denying criminal defendants the right to
challenge the validity of an FTO designation as a defense. 40  Notably,
the fact that Rahmani was a criminal case, versus the preceding civil
cases, may have convinced the court that it was duty-bound to ensure
that the prosecution comported with due process since a greater liberty
interest was at stake. At the writing of this Article, Rahmani is only
binding in the Federal Central District Court of California and has
129. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
130. See id. at 1053 ("Although Section 1189 directs judicial review of foreign terrorist
organization designations to the D.C. Circuit, such review is not restricted to that court."). See also
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
131. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
132. Id. at 1047; See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 F.R. 52650, (Oct.
8, 1997) (designating Mojahedin-e Khalq, as well as its aliases People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran,
Org. of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran, and Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran).
133. U.S. v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (ruling that the government cannot use a
prior deportation against a defendant if it was a result of a due process violation and such violation
was prejudicial).
134. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
135. Id. at 1055.
136. Id. at 1058.
137. Id. at 1055.
138. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 192 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
139. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1056-57.
140. Id. at 1054; 8 U.S.C.A. § I I89(a)(8) (West 2003).
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already been rejected by the Federal Southern District Court of New
York.'
4 1
2. DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC POWERS ACT (IEEPA)
With respect to the three Islamic charities mentioned in this
Article's introduction, 42 the government applied the IEEPA to either
initially freeze their assets pending an investigation and subsequent
designation as SDGTs 143 or designated the organization as an SDT or an
SDGT followed by the immediate seizure of its assets. 44  Unlike the
AEDPA designation cases, the courts reviewing IEEPA designations
have been less flexible regarding challenges to the accuracy and
completeness of the administrative record.
The treatment of the Holy Land Foundation for Global Relief and
Development is an example of the less flexible approach. The Holy
Land Foundation (HLF) is a non-profit organization founded in 1989 and
headquartered in Richardson, Texas.145 Despite HLF's claims that it is
merely a 501(c)(3) charitable organization that provides humanitarian aid
worldwide, it was designated on December 4, 2001 as an SDGT for
acting for or on behalf of Hamas.146 HLF was re-designated on May 31,
2002.147 Consequently, all of HLF's funds, accounts, and real property
were frozen pursuant to a Blocking Notice issued by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).' 48 Moreover, all transactions involving
property in which HLF has any interest are prohibited without specific
authorization from OFAC.1
49
The designation, as well as the Blocking Notice, was based on an
administrative record compiled by the Secretary of State. 50  HLF
requested a de novo review based on the administrative record's failure
to include additional evidence submitted by HLF that was contrary to
141. The Southern District of New York refused to adhere to Rahmani for the Defendants'
constitutional challenges to AEDPA's Fro designation process. United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr.
395, 2003 WL 21698266, *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003).
142. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 57 (D.D.C.
2002); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 808 (N.D. III. 2002).
143. IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(B) (West 2003) (making an investigation into whether or not an
organization provides material support to terrorists sufficient grounds for freezing its assets). This
procedure took place with respect to the Global Relief Foundation. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill,
315 F.3d 748, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2002).
144. This procedure took place with respect to the Holy Land Foundation. Holy Land
Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
145. Id. at 57.
146. Id. at 64.
147. Id. at 66 n.8.
148. Id. at 64.
149. Holy LandFound, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
150. Id.
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OFAC's position. 151  HLF accused OFAC of purposely excluding
evidence available to it, making the record incomplete and inaccurate to
the detriment of HLF. 152 The D.C. District Court rejected HLF's basis
for requesting the inclusion of extra-record evidence as speculative and
strictly applied a well-established rule limiting the scope of review under
the Administrative Procedure Act to the original administrative record.
53
The court reasoned that because OFAC does provide an organization
post-deprivation rights to present counter-evidence to supplement the
administrative record, the administrative record becomes binding on the
court's scope of review.1 54 However, HLF's post-deprivation right to
present evidence is limited to a brief fifteen-day period and applies only
to redesignations1 55 OFAC also retains the power to reject the counter-
evidence and reject any requests for time extensions to the fifteen-day
window. 56 These decisions are not subject to judicial review. OFAC's
unrestricted power to reject evidence is used more often than not to
refuse incorporating the counter-evidence into the administrative record,
making the right to present counter-evidence a meaningless formality.' 57
HLF also challenged the administrative record and designation
process on procedural due process grounds because the organization was
not provided with pre-designation notice (on the original designation) or
a hearing to offer counter-evidence to include in the administrative
record.158 Although the Court acknowledged the Government's failure to
provide prior notice and a hearing, the Court found that this failure did
not constitute a due process violation. 59 The court clearly distinguished
the case from National Council of Resistance ofIran based on the fact
that the Presidentially-declared national emergency under the IEEPA
constituted an "extraordinary situation in which postponement of notice
and hearing until after seizure d[oes] not deny due process."' 60 More
specifically, the court found that the Government had satisfied the
following requirements: 1) the deprivation served an important
government interest (combating terrorism); 2) prompt action was
necessary to prevent transfer of assets prior to the blocking order; and 3)
government officials blocked the assets pursuant to the IEEPA.'
6'
151. Id. at 65.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 66.
154. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 65 & 66 n.7.
155. Note that the April 30, 2002 notice of a i5-day response period for the redesignation
administrative proceeding was not provided for the original designation on December 4, 2001. Id. at
66 n.8.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 66 n.8.
158. Id.
159. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
160. Id. at 57 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
161. Id. at 76-77.
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In a similar case, an Illinois District Court in Global Relief
Foundation v. O'Neill employed the same reasoning and arrived at the
same conclusion. 62 The Global Relief Fund (GRF) was founded in 1992
and became one of the largest U.S.-based Islamic charitable
organizations. 63  Over 90% of its approximately $3.7 million in
donations were spent on humanitarian relief programs abroad in
Afghanistan, Albania, and Bosnia. On December 14, 2001, GRF's
financial assets were frozen, without prior notice, in addition to the
physical seizure of most of the property located in its main office.'
64
OFAC utilized the amendment to the IEEPA by the USA PATRIOT
ACT to freeze the assets pending an investigation on whether or not GRF
was an SDGT. 165 The court concluded that the government's need to
prevent transfer of assets or destruction of records justified freezing
GRF's assets until the charity could be formally indicted and tried for
supporting terrorism. 166 GRF was subsequently designated as an SDGT
by OFAC on October 18, 2002.167
As for GRF's allegations of inadequate post-deprivation
procedures, the court responded by blaming GRF for not taking
advantage of post-blocking options that the court believed satisfied due
process. 16  For example, on the day GRF's assets were frozen, OFAC
gave notice of GRF's right to present evidence and arguments in its
defense. 169 OFAC also informed GRF of its ability to apply for a license
from OFAC to obtain funds to pay salaries, rent, utility payments, and
attorneys fees. 7° Although GRF did apply for and receive the payment
licenses, it did not act on the opportunity to present evidence because the
same person responsible for GRF's prosecution would be receiving the
evidence and deciding whether or not it should be admitted into the
administrative record.' 7  Despite GRF's seemingly valid concerns, the
court ruled that any harm incurred from the lack of counter-evidence in
the record was due to GRF's refusal to utilize the available
administrative remedies. Consequently, the court refused to find any
post-deprivation due process violations. 72  The Seventh Circuit
162. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 779 (N.D. 111. 2002).
163. Id at 785-86.
164. Id. at 786.
165. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
asset freeze was justified based on a pending OFAC investigation as to whether GRF was a specially
designated global terrorist).
166. Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d. at 798.
167. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Recent OFAC Actions, at
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20021018.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2003).
168. Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 804-05.
172. Id.
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subsequently upheld the trial court's decision, and the Supreme Court
refused to grant a writ of certiorari.
73
In summary, the courts have been more skeptical of FTO
designations under the AEDPA than under the IEEPA with respect to
procedural due process rights. The Rahmani court went as far as
declaring the AEDPA procedures facially unconstitutional on Fifth
Amendment procedural due process grounds, yet refused to find any
substantive due process violations. 7 4 On the other hand, the courts in
Holy Land Foundation and Global Relief Foundation acted much more
deferentially due to the fact that the President's declaration of a national
emergency served as the basis for their designations and denial of pre-
deprivation notice and hearings.175 The following section will challenge
the courts' conclusions on constitutional as well as normative grounds.
B. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN THE TERRORIST DESIGNATION
PROCESS
Because the two major FTO designation processes involve
different actions by the government, their respective constitutional
shortcomings will be addressed separately. Each method impacts
procedural due process by denying pre-deprivation notice and hearings,
which increases the risk of erroneous deprivation. The
disproportionately high application of these methods against Arab and
Muslim entities may also implicate substantive due process rights.
76
The forthcoming analysis begs the question: Where should the line be
drawn between permitting legitimate, although unpopular, humanitarian
aid and preventing terrorism, while preserving fundamental
constitutional rights?
1. DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT (AEDPA)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was passed
amidst numerous criticisms regarding the law's draconian nature and
susceptibility to prosecutorial abuse. 77  The AEDPA's designation
process allows for improper selective enforcement based on ethnic or
religious background, poses a high risk of erroneous deprivation,
173. Global Relief Foundation v. Snow, 72 USLW 3092 (2003); Global Relief Foundation,
Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002); Charles Lane, Justices Rule on Detainiee's Rights,
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at Al.
174. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
175. Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76-77 (D.D.C.
2002); Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04.
176. See infra subpart III(B)(l)(a).
177. See Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8.
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provides insufficient judicial review, and stifles freedom of association.
More specifically, past and ongoing applications of AEDPA provisions
reveal a disconcerting trend of discrimination against Muslims and Arab
entities and individuals.1 78 As a result, substantive as well as procedural
due process rights are at risk. Each of these issues will now be addressed
in turn.
a) DISCRETIONARY ABUSE BASED ON ETHNICITY AND RELIGION-
VIOLATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The AEDPA does not neutrally prohibit all material support to
FTOs that use violence, but only to those designated by the Secretary of
State. If the designation is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion ... ,"179 then it is an unlawful violation of the statute as well as
a violation of substantive due process.180 Therefore, the Secretary of
State should not abuse her discretion through disproportionate
application against politically unpopular groups and individuals based on
their ethnic or religious backgrounds.' 8 ' Islamic and Arab Middle
Eastern groups, however, have been cited in disproportionately high
numbers on past and current FTO lists. At least 15 out of the 31
organizations were affiliated with Islam and/or Arabs in the October 8,
1997 FTO list; 8 2 14 out of 23 on October 8, 1999;183 21 out of 39 on the
December 7, 2001, and 19 out of the 33 listed organizations on March
27, 2002. 184 The vast majority of those accused of aiding terrorism
organizations, which usually entails the iniquitous use of secret evidence,
have been of Muslim faith or Arab descent. 8 5
Recently, the Senate Finance Committee has applied its rarely
invoked powers to obtain private financial records held by the
government. 186 The Committee has asked the Internal Revenue Service
to turn over confidential tax and financial records, including donor lists,
on dozens of Muslim charities and foundations. 8 7 Many Muslim leaders
178. Adrienne R. Bellino, Changing Immigration for Arabs with Anti-Terrorism
Legislation: September l1th Was Not the Catalyst, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 131-32
(2002).
179. 8 U.S.C.A. §1 189(b)(3)(A) (West 2003).
180. See Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217 (1985) (defining
substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as protection from arbitrary or
capricious government acts).
181. Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8, at 10.
182. 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997).
183. 65 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Sept. 12, 1999).
184. 66 Fed. Reg. 63,620 (Dec. 7, 2001).
185. For specific cases of the disproportionate use of secret evidence against Arabs and
Muslims, see generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilty by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L.
& RELIGION 267 (2000-200 1). See also supra note 11.
186. Eggen & Mintz, supra note 4.
187. Id; see also MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS CENTER, List of Muslim Groups Being Probed by
Senate Committee, at www.mcrcnet.org/Enewsletters/Enews-details_2004.htm#7 (last visited Jan.
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fear that such government tactics unfairly smear law-abiding Muslims
and dry up financial support for groups trying to provide medicine, food,
and other goods to the Middle East.188  Moreover, "the Muslim
community would view this as another fishing expedition solely
targeting Muslims in America."'8 9 Some, on the other hand, argue these
results are due more to international political trends than U.S. foreign
policy biases. 190 As discussed below however, non-Arab or non-Muslim
FTO organizations and individuals have been treated more favorably in
some cases than their Arab and/or Muslim counterparts.
Consider, for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA). PIRA is a multi-purpose organization in Ireland that operates
similarly to Hamas (also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement) in
Israeli-occupied Palestine. In addition to providing the population with
humanitarian aid, PIRA has been held responsible for numerous terrorist
attacks. In contrast to Hamas' designation, however, the Secretary of
State has not designated PIRA as a foreign terrorist organization. When
a few Congressmen objected to the double standard and called for
PIRA's designation as an FTO, their colleagues accused them of bigotry
and ignorance. 19 1 Similar outcries of prejudice would likely occur if the
government were to treat individuals affiliated with (undesignated) Irish
terrorist groups, exposing the politics behind the selective enforcement of
anti-terrorism laws. 192  Likewise, the Secretary of State explicitly
excluded the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from its 1997 list, yet the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is explicitly referred to as a
terrorist organization in the Immigration and Naturalization Act and any
officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the PLO is considered to
be engaged in a terrorist activity. 93  Therefore, IRA officials were
25, 2004) (citing Al Haramain Foundation, Alavi Foundation, Benevolence International
Foundation, Global Relief Foundation, Help the Needy, Holy Land Foundation, Human Appeal
International, Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America, International Islamic Relief
Organization, Islamic American Relief Agency, Islamic Assembly of North America, Islamic
Association for Palestine, Islamic Circle of North America, Islamic Foundation of America, Islamic
Society of North America, Kind Hearts, Muslim Arab Youth Association, Muslim Student
Association, Muslim World League, Rabita Trust, SAAR Foundation, Solidarity International,
United Association for Studies and Research, and World Assembly of Muslim Youth).
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting Ibrahim Hooper, the spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic
Relations).
190. Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center Bombing:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information of the
Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Steven Emerson), at
www.geocities.com/CollegePark/6453/emerson.html (last visited Sep. 9, 2003).
191. Jacqueline Benson, Send Me Your Money: Controlling International Terrorism By
Restricting Fundraising in the United States, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 321,344-47 (1999).
192. Cole, Secrecy, supra note 185, at 287.
193. 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997) (listing the foreign terrorist organizations as of
October 8, 1997, which did not include the Irish Republican Army); see also Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 n.5 (1998) (noting the fact that the IRA has not been designated
as a terrorist organization); 8 U.S.C.A. § II 82(a)(3)(B)(i) (West 2003) ("An alien who is an officer,
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admitted into the U.S. to raise funds, while their Palestinian counterparts
were not.' 94 The State Department rationalized the decision based on the
IRA's recent cease-fire and peace negotiations. 95 However, the PLO's
entrance into peace talks with Israel in 1993 was not treated with similar
leniency.
Another illuminating example of the U.S. government's double
standards pertains to two Israeli organizations, Kach and Kahane Chai,
who were designated as FTOs by the Secretary of State.196  One of
Kahane's devout supporters, Baruch Goldstein, brutally shot 29 Muslims
to death in Israeli-occupied Palestine while they were kneeling down in
prayer in a mosque. 97 The Kahane's anti-Arab racism was so extreme
that the group was outlawed in Israel. 98 Nonetheless, the United States
permitted the organization to tour the U.S. in order to raise funds.' 99 The
government claimed it was afraid that by prohibiting the tour, it would
stigmatize Jews and Israelis. 2°° Most likely, strong domestic political
interest groups, as well as U.S. foreign policy, influenced the U.S.
government's preferential treatment. It is highly improbable that the
same treatment would be afforded to Hamas or Jihad nor has the
government been as concerned with stigmatizing Arabs and Muslims in
America.2°'
The U.S. government has also failed to deal with homegrown
(non-Arab and non-Muslim) domestic terrorist threats with the same
stringency applied to Arab and Muslim groups and individuals. FBI
statistics show that most acts of domestic terrorism are attributable to
domestic groups.20 2 Nearly 70 percent of all potential terrorist events
between 1996 and 1998, including the Oklahoma federal building
bombing, originated from domestic sources. Extreme right-wing armed
militias have posed a real threat for years.203  However, the FBI's
haphazard and ethnically-based use of the "terrorist" label discounts the
real threat of domestic terrorism to the American public.
official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is considered, for
purposes of this Act, to be engaged in a terrorist activity.").
194. Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Anti-
Terrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2825, 2870-71 (2001).
195. Id. at 2870.
196. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088 (Oct. 5, 2001);
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Oct. 8, 1999, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999);
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997).
197. Bradley Burston, Slain Rabbi Meir Kahane Runs From the Grave, HA'ARETZ, Dec.
12, 2002 (noting the glorification of Baruch Goldstein by Kahane for his 1992 shooting of 29
Palestinians kneeling down in prayer).
198. Id.
199. Whidden, supra note 194, at 2872.
200. Id. at 2873.
201. Id. at 2872-73.
202. Id. at 2852.
203. Id. at 2853-60 (describing in detail specific domestic terrorist groups engaging in
violent forms of domestic terrorism).
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The arrests that have taken place since September 11, 2001, in
addition to the designation of the three major Islamic charities support
the contention that the U.S. government has disproportionately targeted
active Muslim and Arab organizations and individuals. All of the
organizations have yet to be formally indicted for providing material
support to terrorist organizations and some were mistakenly placed under
investigation. 204 For example, in November of 2001 the U.S. Department
of Treasury froze the assets of Al-Barakaat, Somalia's largest money-
transfer company. 20 5 The company was accused of providing millions of
dollars to terrorists abroad.2 °6 But in August of 2002, the government
unfroze the assets upon discovering that AI-Barakaat was merely a
legitimate channel for Somalians in America to transfer money to their
family members in Somalia.20 7 Another example is of Jesse Maali, a
U.S. citizen millionaire residing in Orlando who was arrested in
November 2002.208 Although he has only been charged with illegally
employing immigrants and tax fraud, the government's openly stated, but
uncorroborated, suspicions of terrorist-related activities has created a
public relations catastrophe for Maali's personal and professional life.209
The mere fact that Maali donated money to the Holy Land Foundation
and Benevolence International, long before they were placed under
investigation, placed him under suspicion by the FBI. 210 However, even
with FISA warrants, the government has yet to produce sufficient
evidence to charge him with an AEDPA crime. 211 A similar situation
exists with Bayan Elashi and his four brothers who were arrested in
Dallas, Texas in 2002.212 The government charged his company,
Infocom Corp, Inc., with providing material support to terrorist groups in
the form of shipping computer parts to Syria and Libya and hiding the
unlawful investments in the internet company.213  He claims the
shipments were to Malta, after which he no longer had control of their
distribution.214  Lastly, on February 26, 2003, 110 federal agents and
state troopers arrested four Syracuse-area men and froze the assets of
204. Note that the asset seizures for the Holy Land Foundation, Global Relief Foundation,
and Benevolence International are all based on the U.S. Government's investigations into these
organizations' activities, which were justified by the Executive's unilateral designations of these
groups as specially designated terrorists. None have been tried in a court of law for providing
material support to terrorist organizations or terrorist activities.
205. U.S. Case vs. 4 Area Men Latest of Several Nationally, POST-STANDARD, Mar. 2,
2003, at Al 6.
206. Id.
207. Id.




212. Glenn R. Simpson & Jess Bravin, New Power Boosts Terror Fight, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Jan. 22, 2003, at A8.
213. Id.
214. Id.
2003] Material Support to Terrorist Organizations 73
Help the Needy Islamic charity. 215  They are accused of violating the
sanctions on Iraq by sending money and humanitarian aid to Iraq.2 16
The facts stated above raise disconcerting questions on the
existence of improper prosecutorial selection based on ethnicity and
religion. Overly broad foreign policy, national defense, and economic
justifications for designations have been utilized to target groups that
focus their efforts on humanitarian projects in the Middle East and
individuals who did not intend their money to be used for violent acts of
terror. 2 17 The arbitrariness inherent in the selection process also weakens
the government's so-called legitimate interest in using anti-terrorism
laws to prevent terrorism. If the interest is so important, why haven't
these laws been applied with similar vigor against non-Arab and non-
Muslim domestic and foreign terrorist groups? It is thus no secret that
most of the charities investigated thus far by the Financial Action Task
Force are under investigation because they are Islamic. 218  Because the
designation process is vulnerable to such discretionary abuse, there exists
a high risk of erroneous deprivation, as exemplified by AI-Barakaat's
experience.21 9
b) THE HIGH RISK OF ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
INTERESTS
The interests affected by the government's FTO designation are
undoubtedly significant. An individual or entity impacted by an FTO
designation risks losing both liberty and property interests. As described
in a previous section, a physically present non-citizen faces removal
from the U.S. and inadmissibility upon her voluntary departure, thus
restricting her freedom to travel. 220 Both citizens and non-citizens face
imprisonment if convicted of providing material support to an FTO.
With respect to the designated organizations, they are not only concerned
215. John O'Brien & John Mariani, How the Feds Broke the Iraq Charity Case; Help the
Needy Probe Included Bugs, Trash Searches, and Financial Sleuthing, POST-STANDARD, Mar. 9,
2003, at Al; No Bail or Quick Trial For Terror Suspect, DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE, July 8, 2003, at
B (upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. government's Iraqi sanctions and refusing bail for a
prominent Muslim doctor accused of illegally sending money to Iraq through Help the Needy).
Although prosecutors insist that he has links to terrorist groups or causes, the doctor has not been
charged with any terrorism charges. No Bail or Quick Trial for Terror Suspect, DEMOCRAT &
CHRONICLE, July 8, 2003, at B.
216. Id.
217. Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8, at 10.
218. The Iceberg Beneath the Charity - Charities As Sources of Terrorist Finance,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2003 at http://www.economist.con/finance/sisplaystory.cfm?sstory-
id=1632610.
219. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text (admitting the unjustified freezing of
Somalia's biggest money-transfer company, AI-Barakaat, due to the lack of evidence and absence of
terrorism related charges, thereby leading to its removal from the IEEPA list of suspect companies in
August 2002).
220. See supra Part 1l(A).
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with retaining control of their assets, but also preventing the high
reputational costs associated with the designation and any criminal
charges of providing material support to an FTO. Therefore, it is vital
for the courts to assure there is not an erroneous deprivation of these
significant interests.
The risk of erroneous deprivation under the AEDPA is very high.
The Secretary of State's complete control over the composition of the
administrative record combined with the courts' inability to allow extra-
record submissions places the target organization in a precariously
vulnerable position.221 To begin with, the organization receives no notice
of any ongoing investigation against it. 2 Therefore, it does not have an
equal opportunity to collect and present evidence to the Secretary of
State in its own defense. Due process is guided by the principle that a
hearing occur "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ,
223
The organization's right to contest the designation within thirty days
after the fact is too little, too late. Its defense is limited to challenging
whatever unclassified evidence, which may be disproportionately low
compared to the classified evidence, is in the administrative record.224
Moreover, the high degree of deference traditionally practiced by the
courts with respect to any foreign affairs claims by the Executive
transforms the post-deprivation hearing into a meaningless formality,
rather than a real opportunity to challenge the liberty or property
deprivation. And since the designation is like a scarlet letter for anyone
affiliated with the entity, it is imperative that the results are accurate.
225
Accordingly, the rulings in both National Council of Resistance of
Iran and Rahmani were correct. Ideally, the relevant AEDPA provisions
should be modified to permit an organization to present evidence in its
defense before the actual designation takes place. This places a
safeguard on the Secretary's control of the record, a discretion
susceptible to abuse. The response that the Secretary of State's
consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury
provides a sufficient check on the Secretary of State is weak. They are
all dependent agencies of the Executive branch susceptible to internal
pressures and have no incentive for challenging each other's
221. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (1999)
("The information recited is certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be received in
court. It is instead material the Secretary of State compiled as a record, from sources named and
unnamed, the accuracy of which we have no way of evaluating.").
222. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
223. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
224. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (N.D. III. 2002) (noting
OFAC's use of substantial classified information with respect to its investigation of Global Reliefs
connections with terrorist organizations).
225. Laurie Goldstein, A Nation at War: Charities, Muslims Hesitation on Gifts as U.S.
Scrutinizes Charities, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2003, at BI (highlighting the increasing reluctance of
many American Muslims to donate money to any Islamic charities out of fear of persecution by the
FBI).
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discretionary powers. Additionally, the ability to present counter-
evidence would create a more accurate and complete record that could be
subject to judicial review after the designation.
One reasonable response to this recommendation to provide a pre-
deprivation hearing is an entity's ability to transfer its assets during the
investigation, minimizing the designation process's punitive objectives.
A feasible response to this valid government concern is to permit the
organization to present extra-record evidence upon its utilization of the
thirty-day contestation period. Thus, a post-deprivation hearing is
granted but without the evidentiary limitations imposed on the
organization. Considering the high stakes involved, it is unfair to limit
the organization's right to properly defend itself in pre- and post-
deprivation hearings.
C) INSUFFICIENT JUDICIAL REVIEW
The AEDPA currently limits judicial review to 1) whether or not
an organization is foreign and 2) whether or not it has engaged in
terrorist activities, meanwhile deferring the third element of the effect on
national security to the Executive branch.226  The high degree of
subjectivity involved in foreign policy, national security, and economic
interests mandates establishing safeguards against the improper targeting
of groups. Since it is highly unlikely that a court will engage in rigorous
judicial review of national security questions, one possible remedy for
this problem would be to increase the scope of judicial review with
respect to the first two elements. The element pertaining to engaging in
terrorist activities is fact-specific and in some cases a subjective
question. Considering that organizations are not given notice or an
opportunity to supplement the administrative record prior to their
designation, they at least deserve the opportunity to present evidence in
court upon raising a timely challenge to the designation. What if the
Secretary of State decides to use primarily classified information in the
administrative record inaccessible to the organization and its attorneys,
but the organization has its own counter-evidence? 227 By refusing to
disclose the government's evidence or to review the plaintiff's counter-
evidence, the court has stripped the organization of any meaningful
defense, making the entire opportunity to challenge a charade.
Moreover, the courts have not, and probably will not in the future,
challenge the Secretary of State's judgment and expertise in compiling a
foreign affairs related record. This result may in part be due to the courts'
226. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 89(a)(1)(C) (West 2003). National security is defined as "the national
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States." Id. at § 1182(c)(2) (2003).
227. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, D.C. No. CV-
98-01971-ABC, *7 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) ("The Secretary is authorized to base the designation on
'classified information,' which is unavailable for review by the designated organization.").
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claims of inexperience in determining the validity of the information
provided in the record. However, allowing the organization to offer its
own evidence may offset the courts' deficiency because the organization
is in the best position to substantially challenge the Secretary's evidence.
Therefore, the organization should be afforded an opportunity to properly
defend itself.
As a final note, the thirty day period for challenging a designation
should be expanded to at least sixty days. It is unreasonable to expect an
organization that is suddenly informed of its designation and
unexpectedly has its assets frozen to find an experienced lawyer who can
develop a meaningful defense within thirty days.
228
2. DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
EMERGENCY POWERS ACT (IEEPA) AND THE RISK OF ERRONEOUS
DEPRIVATION
The designation process under the IEEPA suffers similar due
process shortcomings as those discussed above with respect to the
AEDPA, thus this discussion will not be repeated in this section.
However, IEEPA designatees do not have the benefit of some of the
AEDPA case law criticizing the flaws in the process. 229 The President's
plenary power over foreign affairs, combined with his self-initiated
emergency powers, essentially foreclose any possibility of meaningful
judicial review.230 Therefore, the courts' unfortunate failure to address
two egregious flaws in the IEEPA designation process is cause for
concern. The short fifteen-day period for submitting post-deprivation
evidence 231 and OFAC's unilateral power to reject counter-evidence
232
invalidates the organization's limited post-deprivation due process rights.
Under the IEEPA, as soon as the government decides to investigate
an entity for providing material support to terrorist organizations, it can
immediately freeze the entity's assets. 233  The statutory designation
process provides no substantive criteria for identifying how the
organizations shall be designated, granting the President complete
discretion. 34  Therefore, as is the case under the AEDPA, the
228. See Miriam Rozen, Foundation Without Representation? Some Law Firms Are Wary
of Taking Clients Accused of Terrorist Ties, TEXAS LAW., Dec. 17, 2001, at I (describing numerous
law firms' concerns with how representing high profile terrorism-related cases will negatively
impact their business and thus prevents them from accepting the cases).
229. This is also the case with the AEDPA. See Nat'l Council of Resistance ofiran v. Dep't
of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1058
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
230. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
231. Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 66 n.8 (D.D.C.
2002).
232. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 804-05 (N.D. III. 2002).
233. USA PATRIOT ACT § 106 (2001).
234. Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8, at 27.
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organization is taken by surprise and left almost helpless due to its
inability to access its own money. Moreover, it may be unaware of the
evidentiary basis for the asset freezing. So when OFAC informs it of its
right to submit counter-evidence within a brief fifteen-day period, the
organization's fears are only intensified. Obtaining a willing and
qualified lawyer to immediately commit to working for a high profile,
controversial case is hard enough in any situation.235 Combine these
circumstances with the urgency of gathering sufficient counter-evidence
within fifteen days of the property confiscation and the right to a post-
deprivation hearing becomes an illusion. Even if the entity requests an
extension, OFAC has complete discretion to deny the request, as was the
case with the Holy Land Foundation.236 Therefore, the entity is placed at
the mercy of an antagonistic government department that is already
convinced of the entity's wrongdoing.
The entity's serious predicament can be resolved in one of two
ways. The courts must either require pre-deprivation hearings or require
OFAC to give the accused organization more time to gather counter-
evidence. If the courts are willing to accept the government's arguments
of exigent circumstances, pressing need for prompt action, and legitimate
government interests, then the court should balance these interests with
the organization's rights to prevent the erroneous deprivation of its assets
In return for accepting post-deprivation hearings, the entity under
investigation should be afforded a reasonable time to hire a lawyer, apply
for a license from OFAC for payment of certain expenses, and compile
counter-evidence for its defense. Fifteen days is clearly an unreasonably
short time frame to satisfy these needs. Consequently, OFAC should
afford the accused at least thirty days with an automatic right of
extension. In rare cases where the deprivation is clearly erroneous and
the entity is immediately prepared to submit counter-evidence, OFAC
should make every effort to schedule a timely hearing.
The next significant shortcoming in the IEEPA is OFAC's
unilateral and unchecked power to refuse whatever counter-evidence is
submitted by the entity under investigation. 237  The organization is
positioned at a disadvantage throughout the entire investigation and
prosecutorial process (assuming charges are ever filed). Its assets are
frozen based on a unilateral and secretive decision-making process by the
Executive branch. The majority of the evidence is classified and
inaccessible to the entity's officers or lawyers.2 3  The organization is
235. See Rozen, supra note 228, at I.
236. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at66 n.8.
237. See id. at 65-66 (stating it was reasonable for OFAC to exclude HLF's counter-
evidence); see also Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, D.C. No. CV-
98-01971-ABC, *7 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) ("The Secretary is authorized to based the designation on
'classified information,' which is unavailable for review by the designated organization.").
238. Id.; Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (N.D. III. 2002) (noting
OFAC's use of substantial classified information with respect to its investigation of Global Relief's
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only entitled to a post-deprivation hearing. No formal criminal charge
need be filed throughout this entire ordeal, and the courts exercise only
limited judicial review.23 9 The only meaningful procedural protection
available is the organization's right to submit counter-evidence to defend
its innocence. Any restraint on this essential right results in unabashed
injustice. Therefore, the role of the courts in reviewing and adjudicating
the organization's evidence is vital. Allowing OFAC to unilaterally
select what counter-evidence to accept into the record is like allowing a
prosecutor to decide whether or not a criminal defendant's evidence is
permissible in court. Clearly this is the role of the judge. The courts in
Holy Land and Global Relief seriously erred when they blindly deferred
to the Executive and refused to review the organization's evidence. If
the evidence was indeed inapplicable or unreliable, the judge must make
that decision, not the party conducting the investigation and the ensuing
prosecution. Otherwise, a defendant's due process rights, compromised
as they may be by a post-deprivation hearing, are invalidated.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
OF THE DESIGNATION PROCESS
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech., 240  First Amendment free speech rights cover a gamut of
activities that include pure speech, symbolic expression, funding of
political campaigns, and commercial speech. 24' The right "to associate
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment" 242 and "the freedom to associate with others for the
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas" is protected by the
First Amendment's freedom of association.243 The act of donating
money to humanitarian projects abroad is comparable to contributing to
political campaigns, which the Court has defined as constitutionally-
protected expressive and associational conduct where the spending of
money advances one's ideas or political beliefs. 44 For example, an
individual's decision to donate money to an Islamic charity that donates
connections with terrorist organizations). The organization cannot access or review the confidential
information. See supra note 39-41 and accompanying text.
239. The Holy Land Foundation, the Global Relief Foundation, and Benevolence
International remain under investigation, but have not been formally charged with providing material
support to terrorism. All three cases recognize that there has yet to be any official criminal charges
of providing material support to terrorism, but merely the designation as a foreign terrorist
organization. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C.
2002); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. III. 2002); Benevolence Int'l
Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (2002).
240. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
241. NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 467 (1999).
242. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
243. Kusper v. Pontkes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15
(1976).
244. Id., quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
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medical supplies to West Bank hospitals serving pregnant Palestinian
refugee women may be an expression of various constitutionally-
protected political and social beliefs. He may believe the pregnant
women have the right to basic medical services despite Israel's refusal to
allow them to pass through the checkpoints to a Jerusalem-based hospital
with adequate facilities. 245 Therefore, the medical supplies purchased
with the donations serve as a direct expression of the donor's
constitutionally protected belief. Or the donor may reject the tragic
impact of the Israeli occupation on these women, as well as their unborn
children, and by sending them medical supplies, he is peacefully
expressing his rejection of the devastating impact of the occupation.
Therefore, political expression and association in the form of
humanitarian aid can be directly analogized with pure speech through
conduct rather than limiting pure speech to direct verbal communication.
The FTO designation process implicates First Amendment rights
because an individual's guilt is imputed based on her nonverbal
expression of donating money, resulting in a suppression of otherwise
valid free speech activities. The criminal and civil penalties that
accompany the designations may stifle freedom of expression and
association by limiting a person's ability to choose where her money will
be donated. The charges of providing material support are also
problematic under the First Amendment because they do not distinguish
between humanitarian contributions and contributions to militant
organizations that openly engage in violent activities. The application of
a "knowingly" rather than an "intentionally" mens rea creates a high risk
of punishing individuals engaged in constitutionally protected forms of
expression. Therefore, the AEDPA criminal provisions are not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to effectuate the government's terrorism
prevention interests while protecting the donor's free speech rights.
Because free speech is a fundamental right, courts generally apply
strict scrutiny against any government action seeking to regulate
speech.246 However, the courts may apply intermediate scrutiny if
speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of
conduct and a sufficiently important governmental interest, versus the
compelling interest required under strict scrutiny, justifies incidental
limitations on First Amendment speech.247 The level of scrutiny applied
245. See, e.g., Israel's Army of Peace: Battle-Scarred Reservists Are Refusing to Serve in
the Occupied Territories, GUARDIAN, Mar. 6, 2002, at 19 (quoting an IDF soldier stating that he
refused to serve after another soldier refused to let a pregnant Palestinian woman through a
checkpoint, resulting in her giving birth to a stillborn child); Birth and Death at the Checkpoint,
HA'ARETZ, Sept. 11, 2003 (describing in detail a Palestinian woman's stillbirth delivery of a baby
girl behind a rock at an Israeli checkpoint in occupied Palestine due to the soldiers' refusal to let her
pass to receive emergency medical attention in Nablus); Gideon Levy, And The Twins Died,
HA'ARETZ, Jan. 9, 2004 (describing the death of twin newborn girls due to their Palestinian mother's
inability to reach a hospital in time after being held up at an IDF checkpoint in the West Bank).
246. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
247. Id. at 376-77.
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depends on whether the government law attempting to regulate the action
in question is related to the suppression of constitutionally protected
expression.248
This Article argues that, with respect to donating money to the
Islamic charities discussed above, the courts mistakenly applied the
O'Brien test of intermediate scrutiny. This conclusion is based on an
analysis of two fundamental questions. First, is donating money a form
of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment? Second, is the
criminal provision for providing material support to FTOs in the AEDPA
related to the suppression of speech? The AEDPA criminal provisions,
as currently written, are related to the suppression of free expression and
the incidental restriction on these free expression rights is greater than
the government interest. Before delving into a doctrinal challenge to the
courts' decisions, a brief summary of existing case law regarding these
questions is due after which this Article will challenge the legal
reasoning of the courts.
A. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
AFFORDED IN THE DESIGNATION PROCESS
1. DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE AEDPA
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno249 was one of the first cases to
challenge FTO designations on First Amendment grounds. The case was
filed soon after the Kurdistan Worker's Party and the Tamil Tigers were
designated under the AEDPA. The plaintiffs challenging these
designations included two U.S. citizens who sought to provide material
support to the humanitarian and political activities, but not the military
activities, of these designated FTOs.250 Fearing criminal prosecution and
conviction if they provided such assistance, the plaintiffs filed suit to
challenge the AEDPA's provision regarding providing material support
to FTOs as a violation of their rights to freedom of speech and
association.25 1  Specifically, the Plaintiffs argued that the AEDPA's
imposition of criminal sanctions without a showing of specific intent to
248. Id. at 375 (justifying the government's action in this case as an appropriately narrow
means of protecting the government's interests).
249. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
250. Id. at 1180. One of the Plaintiffs, The Tamil Welfare and Human Rights Committee
(TWHRC), focuses on protecting the human rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka and promoting their
health, social well-being, and welfare. Due to the FTO designation of the Tamil Tigers, the TWHRC
is unable to provide direct relief, medical, and social services to Tamil refugees. The TWHRC is
explicit in its intention to only support the Tamil Tiger's humanitarian efforts and not its military
efforts. ld. at 1184.
251. Id. at 1185.
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further the FTO's illegal objectives imposed guilt by association in
violation of the First Amendment.
252
Generally, any regulation that prohibits expression or association
based on the denunciation of the speech's content is subject to strict
253scrutiny. However, if the government's regulation is unrelated to the
suppression of a specific message or idea, then it is content-neutral and
subject to intermediate scrutiny.25 4 The Court ruled that although the
provision of material support in the form of donations is protected First
Amendment activity, the AEDPA's criminal provisions are content
neutral regulations because they do not distinguish between favored and
disfavored speech. 55 Consequently, the court applied the O'Brien5 6
standard of intermediate scrutiny to reject the Plaintiff's First
Amendment claims. 257  O'Brien involves the following four-pronged
balancing test: (1) whether the regulation is within the power of the
government; (2) whether the regulation furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; (3) whether the proferred interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) whether the
incidental restriction on the First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to further the important interest.
25 9
With respect to the first prong, the Plaintiffs did not contest the
Secretary's authority to designate or the importance of preventing
terrorism. 259  They were unsuccessful, however, in challenging the
effective suppression of free speech that resulted from the ban on
providing humanitarian aid. The plaintiffs' corresponding significant
freedom of association rights were essentially trumped by the
government's compelling terrorism-prevention interest.260  The court
rejected the plaintiff's free speech claims because the content-neutral
restriction did not prevent the plaintiffs from conveying any particular
message or idea in a communicative manner.261 The donation of physical
property was insufficiently "speech related" conduct to warrant First
Amendment protection,262 and the plaintiffs could still promote the
organizations' political and humanitarian goals as long as they did not
252. Id.; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-28 (1961) (requiring that the
government prove personal guilt in order to adhere to the Fifth Amendment's due process
requirement).
253. Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1186-87.
254. Id. at 1187.
255. Id. at 1188, aff'd205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
256. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (stating that if the law is content-
neutral and is directed at non-communicative elements of the Plaintiff's actions, then an intermediate
level of scrutiny is sufficient)
257. Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1193.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1193-94.
262. Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 n. 18.
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send them material support.263 In other words, the simple fact that the
AEDPA made it more difficult for the plaintiffs to promote their
organizations' political and humanitarian goals did not render the
AEDPA excessively restrictive. 264  Ultimately, the U.S.'s substantial
national security and foreign policy interests quashed the U.S. citizens'
constitutionally protected activities with foreign entities and relieved the
court of applying a strict scrutiny analysis.
265
After five years of litigation on this case, the Ninth Circuit recently
declined to reconsider the plaintiffs four prior legal challenges to its
266FTO designation. However, the court correctly ruled that "18 U.S.C. §
2339B, by not requiring proof of personal guilt, raises serious Fifth
Amendment due process concerns. 267  The court avoided the
constitutional concerns by construing the statute as requiring "proof that
a person charged with violating the statute had knowledge of the
organization's designation or knowledge of the unlawful activities that
caused it to be so designated., 26' The court based its ruling on numerous
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases from the McCarthy-era aimed at
protecting individual members from having the organization's intent
imputed upon them for prosecutorial purposes. 269 Other circuits should
take heed of the Ninth Circuit's justified concerns with individuals' Fifth
Amendment rights and interpret the FTO designation law in a similar
manner.
2. DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE IEEPA
The Islamic charities, which were designated as terrorist under the
IEEPA, were also subject to the AEDPA's criminal sanctions for
263. Id. at 1194 n.14.
264. Id. at 1195-96.
265. Note, however, that even had the Court applied strict scrutiny to the AEDPA
provisions, the ruling would have been the same. Id. at 1197 n.20 (affirmed in Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
266. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, D.C. No. CV-98-
01971-ABC, *22 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) ("[W]e decline to reconsider plaintiffs' four legal
challenges that we considered in full in Humanitarian Law Project I, i.e., (1) that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
violated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freedom of association because it impermissibly
imposed a criminal penalty for their association with the designated organizations; (2) that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B violated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to association by prohibiting them from giving
political contributions to the designated organizations; (3) that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was a content-
based restriction on symbolic speech and failed to survive strict scrutiny; and (4) that 8 U.S.C. §
1189 violated plaintiffs' First and Fifth Amendment rights because the scheme gave the Secretary
unfettered licensing power to designate an organization as a terrorist organization.").
267. Id. at '5.
268. Id. at *24.
269. Id. at *25-*32 (citing Scales v. United States, 367, U.S. 203, 224-28 (1961); Hellman
v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961); Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.
1964); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)).
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providing material support to terrorist organizations.270 In addition, any
donors to the charities themselves were subject to the same criminal
sanctions. 27  Therefore, the organizations sought to continue donating
humanitarian aid to recipients worldwide by challenging their
designation on First Amendment grounds.
In Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v.
Ashcroft,272 the Plaintiff, an SDT under the IEEPA, also argued that the
prohibition on its humanitarian contributions violated its First
Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech.2 73 HLF cited
the Government's failure to adhere to the specific intent requirement in
Claiborne Hardware as a violation of its freedom of association.274 The
Plaintiff claimed that by failing to establish HLF's specific intent to
further Hamas' illegal objectives, the government had essentially
imposed guilt by association. 275 The court rejected the claim by noting
that the blocking order did not prohibit membership in Hamas or
endorsement of its ideas. Moreover, the prohibition on providing
material support is not constitutionally sanctioned. Therefore, the court
concluded that the ruling in Claiborne Hardware, which focused on
imposing liability on the basis of association alone was inapplicable to
HLF's case, and therefore, the specific intent requirement was equally
inapplicable to HLF.276 The court believed a specific intent requirement
would substantially undermine the efficacy of the economic sanctions.277
The Court agreed that the Holy Land Foundation's humanitarian
contributions were a form of speech, but applied the O'Brien test for the
same reasons it applied it in Humanitarian Law Project and reached the
same conclusion.2 78 The court held that Buckley v. Valeo's 2 79 strict
scrutiny requirement was inapplicable because humanitarian
contributions abroad were distinguishable from "political contributions
[that] implicated core First Amendment rights of political expression in a
democratic society."280 As long as the humanitarian aid restrictions did
not restrict HLF's viewpoints, including endorsements of Hamas, then no
free speech violation existed.28' Finally, the Court emphasized the
fungibility of money. Regardless of HLF's legitimate charitable
intentions, the prohibition was necessary to assure that contributions for
270. See supra Part 1(B).
271. Id.
272. 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002).
273. Id. at 62.
274. See NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 919 (1982); see also Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-28 (1961) (requiring that the government prove personal guilt in
order to adhere to the Fifth Amendment's due process requirement).
275. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 80-81.
276. Id. at 81.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
280. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81 n.37.
281 Id at R2
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peaceful purposes did not free up funds for terrorist activities.282 The
government's national security interest in combating terrorism trumped
any incidental infringements on free speech.283
Another Islamic charity, the Global Relief Fund, also challenged
its designation under IEEPA as a violation of its First Amendment
rights. GRF focused its claims on President Bush's September 23,
2001 Executive Order by claiming that it was unconstitutionally
overbroad.285 The Executive Order permits the freezing of assets of any
person who "acted for, sponsored, or was otherwise associated with a
person determined to be a terrorist. '286  GRF challenged the term
"associated with" as overbroad and an infringement on free speech
rights. However, the Court rejected GRF's argument, finding that the
Executive Order did not directly regulate protected speech or expression,
nor did it grant discretion to an official to determine content-specific
guidelines on what is prohibited. Accordingly, any effects on speech that
might result were merely incidental and were not substantially more than
necessary to further the government's legitimate interest in preventing
terrorism. 287 The Court's reasoning mirrored that in Humanitarian Law
Project as it applied the O'Brien test. Ultimately, the Court concluded
that the Executive Order, as applied to United States citizens, was
unlikely to violate the First Amendment.288
B. VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION
This Article argues that with respect to the Islamic charities
cases,289 the courts mistakenly invoked the O'Brien test of intermediate
scrutiny, denying the organizations and their membership First
Amendment freedom of expression rights. The answers and analysis
relevant to two fundamental questions support this conclusion: (1)
whether donating money is a form of expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment; (2) is the criminal provision for providing material
support to FTOs in AEDPA related to the suppression of speech. The
following sections explain why the answer to both questions is in the
affirmative.
282. Id. at 82 n.38.
283. Id. at 82.
284. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. III. 2002).
285. Id. at 805.
286. Id. at 806.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 57 (D.D.C.
2002); Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 779; Benevolence Int'l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200
F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. II1. 2002).
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1. CHARITABLE DONATIONS ARE PROTECTED FIRST AMENDMENT
SPEECH
Although the First Amendment only explicitly refers to speech, the
Court has long recognized that the protection is not limited to spoken or
written forms of communication.290 Conduct falls under 'speech' for
First Amendment purposes if it is "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication [that] fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments., 291 The Court decides whether or not the communication
is sufficient to pass this vague test by inquiring into the actor's "intent to
convey a particularized message . . . and the likelihood . . . that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it." 292 Moreover, the
distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct is
irrelevant if the nonverbal conduct is expressive and the regulation of
that conduct is related to expression.293 The Supreme Court has ruled
that donating money to political campaigns is a form of expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment as a form of political
association or political expression.294  Other examples of conduct as
speech include burning the American flag, nude dancing, and cross
burning.
295
There is no satisfactory rationale for treating donations to
humanitarian activities any different than donations to political
campaigns with respect to their significance as First Amendment
rights.296 By focusing on the superficial differences between political
parties and humanitarian projects as a means to deny charitable donors
the rights of political donors, the courts overlooked the real value of the
inclusion of financial donations as a form of free speech rights. For that
reason, the Islamic charities cases did involve constitutionally-protected
First Amendment freedom of political expression and association.
The courts in Humanitarian Law Project,297  Holy Land
Foundation,298 and Global Relief Foundation299 mistakenly disregarded
the politically expressive value of sending humanitarian aid, whether in
the form of monetary donations or physical property. The donor's
contribution is a clear expression of her political, ethical, or religious
290. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
291. Id. (citing Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
292. Id. (citing Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
293. Id. at416.
294. Id.
295. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Virginia v. Black, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
296. Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8, at I I (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65-
66(1976)).
297. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
298. Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002).
299. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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associations as incidental to a legitimate regulation of conduct.300 Take,
for instance, an individual's decision to donate money to an Islamic
charity that donates toys to Palestinian refugees in Gaza. The
individual's conduct may be an expression of various constitutionally-
protected political and social beliefs. She may believe those children
have the right to live as normal a childhood as possible given their
oppressive circumstances. Therefore, those toys will serve as a direct
expression of her constitutionally protected belief. Or she may reject the
tragic impact of the Israeli occupation on these children, and by sending
them toys, she is peacefully expressing her rejection of the occupation.
If the right of expression excludes the right to contribute money, then it
is a meaningless formality. "The right to join together for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas ... is diluted if it does not include the
right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if
advocacy is to be truly or optimally effective.,30'
However, the courts concluded that as long as the law does not
preclude membership in Hamas or endorsement of its views then the
Plaintiffs' associational rights are not implicated.30 2  This conclusion
completely misses the very reason why the Islamic charities are
challenging their designations. They are not seeking to freely join the
ranks of Hamas or endorse their military activities. Rather they seek the
right to donate funds to legitimate humanitarian aid projects that support
hospitals, orphanages, and schools, without being collectively punished
for a few individuals' illegitimate and violent activities.30 3
Consequently, the government is suppressing individuals' rights to
effectively associate with groups and activities (through the giving of
humanitarian aid) that the government unilaterally deems contemptible.
Such action is explicitly prohibited by the Constitution.30 4
The Islamic charity cases discussed above also mistakenly
differentiate between pure speech activities and non-speech expression in
the context of First Amendment rights. According to the courts, pure
speech deserves First Amendment protection and strict scrutiny analysis,
while non-expressive forms of conduct are secondary and subject to
intermediate scrutiny. This reasoning is a reflection of current free
speech jurisprudence where non-expressive association is protected only
if it is intimate and affects the right to privacy.30 5 Intimate conduct refers
300. David Cole, Hanging With The Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of
Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 210 (1999).
301. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1976). Note that this case focuses primarily on
political campaign funding.
302. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
303. See Duncan, supra note 16 (describing an Islamic charity's, KINDER USA, objective
of providing food, household products, and other day-to-day items to Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza).
304. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (stating "the government may not prohibit
expression simply because it disagrees with its message").
305. Cole, Wrong Crowd, supra note 300, at 209.
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to marriage, childbirth, raising and educating children, and cohabitation
of one's relatives, but not donating money for political or religious
reasons.30 6 Therefore, limiting one's charitable donations is perceived as
a means of combating terrorism rather than suppressing an overt
manifestation of an individual's personal belief that a specific
humanitarian cause is worthy of her financial assistance. As long as this
inaccurate distinction is accepted, the courts are unlikely to apply the
traditional strict scrutiny test to future challenges to the laws governing
providing material support to designated FTOs. As a result, numerous
well-intentioned individuals have fallen prey to a witch-hunt by the
government against anyone associated with politically unpopular causes,
specifically those affiliated with Islam or Arabs.0 7
In the case of humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees, the
situation is particularly problematic. For various reasons beyond the
scope of this Article, Hamas operates a large number of orphanages,
nursing homes, hospitals, women's clinics, religious colleges, sports
clubs, and vocational schools. In some parts of Palestinian refugee
camps, only Hamas-affiliated welfare programs exist. Therefore, it is
difficult to donate to a legitimate humanitarian project without indirectly
308interacting with one of Hamas's non-violent welfare programs.
Because Muslims worldwide are required to donate 2.5% of their annual
income to charity, preferably to assist impoverished Muslims, numerous
American Muslims want to donate money to humanitarian projects in
war-torn areas in the Middle East.30 9 However, they do not want their
money to contribute to any political or violent activities in the region.
Nonetheless, well-intentioned donors may still be criminally liable for
these contributions because the statutory definition of wrongdoing has
been expanded to include these otherwise innocent humanitarian
activities. Donors must decide between practicing their constitutional
non-speech expressive rights while running the high risk of criminal
prosecution, and denying themselves these rights by ceasing to donate.310
306. Id.
307. Roig-Franzia, supra note 10, at A4 (describing the U.S. government's prosecution of
Jesse Maali because of his large donations to Islamic charities during the 1990s and the
government's inability to charge him for providing material support due lack of evidence); William
Kates, US. Details Doctor's Fund-Raising, TIMES UNION, Mar. 9, 2003, at D6 (describing the
investigation into Dr. Rafil Dhafir's fund-raising for charities in Iraq which has not produced
sufficient evidence to charge him with any terrorism crimes, but simply that he made donations to
the Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International); No Bail or Quick Trial for Terror
Suspect, DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE, July 8, 2003, at 5B (highlighting the government's failure to
produce sufficient evidence to charge Dr. Dhafir with terrorist charges, yet their continued labeling
of his charitable fund-raising activities as terrorist).
308. Bellino, supra note 178, at 138.
309. Goldstein, supra note 225.
310. See generally Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (setting aside a conviction
for using tape to form a peace symbol on the American flag in violation of a state law forbidding the
exhibition of an American flag to which figures, symbols, and other extraneous materials are
attached); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (setting aside a
suspension of students wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War); Buckley v.
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2. THE AEDPA's "KNOWINGLY" MENVS REA IMPOSES GUILT BY
ASSOCIATION, AND SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "INTENTIONALLY"
Once it is established that conduct qualifies as speech under the
First Amendment, the next question is whether or not the government's
action is related to the suppression of that speech. The answer revolves
around the "content-neutral" nature of the government regulation.
Although the government has more leeway to restrict expressive conduct
than it does with restrictions on the written or spoken word,3 ' the
government may not prohibit the expression simply because it disagrees
with the expressive conduct. 312 However, determining content-neutrality
is by no means a straightforward or predictable process. The Court's
application of vague standards such as "conitent-neutral" laws has
produced seemingly contradictory results. In one case, the Court struck
down a Texas law prohibiting the burning of the U.S. flag because the
law in effect suppressed the defendant's right to express his political
beliefs.313 In contrast, 20 years prior, the Court rejected any claims that
burning one's draft card was necessarily expressive or a form of
symbolic speech.31 4 Consequently, a federal law prohibiting the knowing
destruction or mutilation of draft cards on the grounds that the law was
content-neutral was upheld and remains good law.315 However,
reasonable minds may disagree as to the degree of similarity between
burning a draft card and burning an American flag with respect to First
Amendment expression rights.
The government claims that the AEDPA does not distinguish
between favored and disfavored speech, but rather is focused on
combating terrorism, thus qualifying for the O'Brien test.3 16 Admittedly,
the objective of the AEDPA material support provisions is legitimate and
facially content-neutral in that it does not explicitly prohibit behavior
based on a viewpoint. However, the knowingly (rather than
intentionally) mens rea element of the provisions, as well as the selective
enforcement of the law against Islamic charities, results in direct
suppression of otherwise constitutionally protected freedom of
expression. Whether an organization is designated under the AEDPA or
the IEEPA, anyone that 'knowingly' donates assets to the organization is
susceptible to criminal prosecution for providing material support to
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (acknowledging the direct relationship between spending money for
political campaigns and expression, justifying its constitutional protection).
311. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
312. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 398,416 (1989).
313. Id. at 420.
314. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.
315. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(3) (Supp. 111967).
316. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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terrorism. 317  Criminal liability exists regardless of whether a donor
intended for her money to be spent on feeding five-year-old children in a
Palestinian refugee camp, and the money was indeed spent according to
that intention, or to fund violent terrorist activities. The donor's specific
intent to spend her money on otherwise legal activities is irrelevant to her
criminal liability. As long as she "knowingly" donated the money to an
FTO that is accused of engaging in lawful and unlawful activities, the
donor is suspect of criminal behavior. Moreover, it is not clear whether
the donor must "know" that the organization has been designated as an
FTO.31 8  Because there is a high probability that a person who donates
money to an Islamic charity, versus directly to a strictly military
organization, is expressing constitutionally protected ideas, the
government should have a constitutional obligation to prove that the
person specifically intended to further illegal terrorist acts."'
One easy way to avoid improperly imputing culpability would be
to change the mens rea for providing material support from "knowingly"
to "intentionally." 320  Numerous individuals have knowingly made
charitable donations to Islamic charities that were designated as FTOs.
However, most of the donors did not know of the designation, should not
have known, or did not intend for their money to be spent on terrorist-
related activities.321 With respect to the accused Islamic charities, most
donors intended for their money to be spent on orphans, schools,
hospitals, and other social welfare programs.322 The fact that the money
may have been misappropriated without their knowledge should not
make them criminally liable for supporting terrorism. Individuals should
not be punished for the misconduct of others, but only for their own.323
Moreover, to place the responsibility on an individual in the U.S. to
know exactly what an organization does thousands of miles away is
317. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339 (West 2003).
318. Only in the Ninth Circuit has it been recently established that the donor must know
that the organizations is a designated FrO. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No.
02-44082, D.C. No. CV-98-01971-ABC, *22 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).
319. For example, an individual who wants to support the military activities of the Kurdish
independence movement, the Iraqi opposition movement, or the Palestinian liberation movement
will probably not send his money to an orphanage, hospital, or elementary school that provides
humanitarian needs to impoverished citizens.
320. Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8.
321. William Patton, Preventing Terrorism Fundraising in the United States, 30 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 127, 151 (1996).
322. Yasser el-Banna, Palestinian Orphans Left out in Ramadarg at
http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2003-11/05/articleO3.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
323. Membership in an organization that has both lawful and unlawful ends cannot serve as
the basis for imposing guilt. NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 103 (2002) (citing
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-28 (1961); NAACP v. Claibome Hardware, 458 U.S. 886
(1982)). See also Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, D.C. No. CV-
98-01971-ABC, *30 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) ("We believe that serious due process concerns would
be raised were we to accept the argument that a person who acts without knowledge of critical
information about a designated organization presumably acts consistently with the intent and
conduct of that designated organization.").
90 TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS [Vol. 9:1
unreasonably burdensome and not similarly imposed on donors to non-
Islamic charities.
Finally, the selective application of anti-terrorism laws based on
ethnicity, race, and religious affiliation 324 rather than individual conduct
reveals that these laws are not necessarily content-neutral.325 The
neutrality ends as soon as the Secretary of State or the President
considers designating an organization based on foreign policy concerns,
which indisputably entail partiality. Domestic political pressures, for
instance, play a large role in determining the selective application of
these powers. As mentioned above, the Government was loathe to apply
stringent anti-terrorism laws to multi-purpose Irish groups lest they anger
their large Irish-American constituency. The same applies to the
Government's attitude towards Jewish settler groups that engage in
violent physical attacks against innocent Palestinian civilians in the West
Bank and Gaza.326 Perhaps the explanation for such disparate treatment
is the realization that not all individuals who associate or support these
groups are morally culpable. Thus, absent a clear intent to directly
support illegal violent activities, the associated individuals are free to act
on their beliefs as they choose, including the donation of money, because
it is their constitutional right to do so. The same reasoning and approach
is not equally applied to individuals associated with Islamic or Arab-
related activities.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The authority to designate an organization as terrorist is indeed a
powerful one. Individuals can be kept out of the country, kicked out of
the country, detained, criminally prosecuted, and denied future rights to
naturalized citizenship. Organizations can be immediately shut down as
their assets are frozen without prior hearing or notice, and all officers and
donors associated with the organization are vulnerable to criminal
324. See supra Part III(B)(I)(a) and discussion on disproportionate representation of
Arab/Muslim groups.
325. See Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 8, at 29.
326. Despite widespread media coverage of illegal Jewish settler violence against innocent
Palestinian civilians in the Palestinian occupied territories, the United States government does not
prosecute an individual for joining the settler movement or donating money to the settler movement
with the possible exception of direct affiliations with Kahan Chai and Kach - only two of numerous
settler movement organizations. See Peter Enav, 3 Israeli Settlers Convicted of Bomb Plot,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 2003 (reporting on the conviction of three Israeli settlers for attempting to
blow up an Arab girls' school in Jerusalem in 2002); Stephen C. Warneck, A Preemptive Strike:
Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the Financial Strength of International Terrorist
Organizations, 78 B.U.L. REv. 177, 187 (1998) (describing the fund-raising activities in the United
States of Jewish fanatical groups Kahan Chai and Kach for the preservation of Jewish settlements in
the West Bank); see also Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance ofInternational Law
to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 129, 153 (1991) (pointing out the United States' failure to effectively pressure Israel towards
removing the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza).
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prosecution for providing material support to a terrorist organization.
327
Although the designation authority existed prior to September 11, 2001,
it has been transformed into an aggressive tool for combating perceived
Middle Eastern and Islamic terrorist threats worldwide. The government
continues to effectively employ its designation authority to halt almost
all domestic activities and organizations associated with the Middle East
or Islam under the auspices of combating terrorism.
The severe consequences of the designation process should be
sufficient cause for concern. However, the Executive branch has
successfully distracted the courts from emphasizing and preserving
constitutional rights. Procedural and substantive due process rights are
being compromised in the name of national security. First Amendment
rights of expression and association are being suppressed due to the
government's more important war on terrorism. Unimpressive rationales
differentiating between speech and non-speech, conduct and expression,
and content-based and content-neutral laws have successfully distracted
judges from protecting vulnerable First Amendment rights.
Accordingly, this Article proposes some changes to the procedures
and laws to minimize the erosion of constitutional rights while respecting
the government's legitimate efforts to combat terrorism. Due to the
complexity of the Article topic, a brief summary of its conclusions is
useful. First, an organization under investigation for FTO-designation
purposes must have the opportunity to provide counter-evidence that will
be included in the judicially reviewable administrative record.
Otherwise, the Secretary of State has complete discretion to include
unchallengeable classified information that biases the judge's analysis
against the organization, increasing the risk of error. Moreover,
designated organizations are effectively denied the right to properly
defend themselves, as would any defendant whose lawyer was prohibited
from conducting legal research and submitting evidence into the trial
record. The court should accept amicus briefs from associated parties
who are vulnerable to future criminal prosecution due to their
associations with the organization. The authority to reject evidence
should lie with the Article III judge, not the prosecution.
Second, the contestation period under AEDPA should be expanded
from thirty to sixty days. Since organizations do not receive notice prior
to designation, due to the government's fears that it will transfer its
assets abroad, the organization needs more time to hire a lawyer and
prepare an adequate defense. In all likelihood, organizations will not
possess the resources, given the freezing of their assets, to defend
themselves in such a short timeframe, making the contestation period a
meaningless formality. In IEEPA cases where organizations' assets are
327. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Treasury has
blocked GRF's accounts and thus effectively shut down its operations around the globe.").
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frozen merely because they are under investigation,328 the organizations'
fifteen day contestation period is inadequate. For the reasons just stated,
the organization must have more time, ideally up to sixty days, to gather
and present evidence to OFAC in its defense. Moreover, OFAC should
not retain the power to reject evidence from inclusion in the
administrative record. Because the administrative record is the only
evidence that an Article III court can review, OFAC's ability to deny the
inclusion of counter-evidence effectively nullifies an entity's ability to
adequately defend itself in court.
Third, criminal charges for providing material support to terrorism
should be based on intent. Knowingly providing material support to a
designated organization is insufficient because individuals may not know
the organizations are formally designated or they may be unaware that
their money might be spent on illegal activities. In order to prevent
unconstitutional impositions of guilt by association, any wrongdoing by
the organization should not be automatically imputed to associated
individuals. 329  Finally, the courts should apply strict scrutiny with
respect to an individual's association with organizations designated as an
FTO or under investigation. The broad powers currently granted to the
Executive branch must be restrained in order to prevent suppressing
individuals' expressive advocacy of lawful activities, regardless of
whether the advocacy takes the form of pure speech or nonspeech
expression.
In sum, although combating terrorism is a legitimate government
interest, the laws pertaining to providing material support to foreign
terrorist organizations are highly susceptible to abuse. Anti-terrorism
laws may be exploited as a cover for stifling a vulnerable ethnic and
religious minority's (in this case Arabs and Muslims) fundamental First
Amendment rights due to racist, ignorant, or majoritarian societal
views. 33  And because the Bill of Rights exists precisely to protect
vulnerable minority groups from the majority's prejudices, especially in
times of crisis, the courts have a heightened responsibility to strictly
scrutinize government actions that would be suspect if correspondingly
applied against the majority. The U.S. government is correct in wanting
to curtail the funding of terrorism, but that objective should not be
synonymous with suppressing an individual's right to donate money or
goods to humanitarian projects in the Middle East.
328. Specially designated organizations under IEEPA investigation.
329. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, D.C. No. CV-
98-01971-ABC, *30 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) ("We believe that serious due process concerns would
be raised were we to accept the argument that a person who acts without knowledge of critical
information about a designated organization presumably acts consistently with the intent and
conduct of that designated organization.").
330. Muslim Charities, 2002 WL 102816973, VOICE OF AMERICA, Press Release and
Documents, Nov. 20, 2002 (describing the drastic decrease in charitable contributions by Muslims to
Islamic organizations due to their fears of government prosecution); see also supra notes 8, 18-19
and accompanying text.
